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Mark D. Walters* Brightening the Covenant Chain:
Aboriginal Treaty Meanings in
Law and History after Marshall
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Marshall raises some
difficult questions about the interpretation of Crown-Aboriginal treaties, espe-
cially treaties dating from the eighteenth century. The Court acknowledged that
the treaty context is important to establishing the meaning of treaty texts, and
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal perspectives must be considered. As a result,
judges must have regard to historical analyses of Crown-Aboriginal relations
when interpreting these old treaties. In this article, the author explores some of
the complex theoretical problems that such legal-historical analyses create,
focusing in particular upon the possibility that lawyers and judges may reach very
different understandings about the meanings of old treaties than historians. As a
vehicle for exploring this problem, the author considers competing approaches to
the definition of the 'Covenant Chain' treaties. He argues that although British and
Aboriginal peoples appeared to define the effect of the Covenant Chain on
Aboriginal sovereignty very differently, British officials always acknowledged the
Aboriginal perspective. Examination of evolving attitudes about the Covenant
Chain in three separate periods (1763-65, 1783-94 and 1830-60) confirm that
sometimes this official acknowledgement was a subordinate one and at other
times it was elevated to a dominant position. The author concludes by considering
whether legal and historical interpretations about shifting approaches to this
treaty may lead to different understandings about Aboriginal sovereignty or, in
other words, about the inherent right of Aboriginal self-government.
La d~cision de la Cour supreme du Canada dans R. c. Marshall a soulev6 des
questions d6licates quant F I'interpr6tation des trait6s entre la Couronne et les
autochtones, en particulier celle des trait6s qui remontent au XVll1e siecle. La
Cour supr6me a reconnu qu'il est important de connaTtre le contexte pour
d6terminer la signification des textes. II faut en outre prendre en consid6ration
tant le point de vue des autochtones que celui des non autochtones. En
cons6quence, les magistrats ne doiventpas ignorer les analyses historiques des
relations entre la Couronne et les autochtones pour fins d'interprdtation de ces
trait6s anciens. Dans cet article, I'auteur explore les problmes th6oriques fort
complexes associ~s A ce type d'analyse ob 'on tente de juxtaposer les dimen-
sions historiques et juridiques, et d6montre combien il est facile pour les
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Osgoode Hall Indigenous Rights Colloquium, and I wish to thank the participants for their
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magistrats et les historiens d'en arriver a des conclusions diff6rentes. L'auteur
explore le probleme en se penchant sur les approches rivales propos6es pour
d6finir les trait6s de la ,chaTne d'alliance,. Selon lui, mime si les autorit6s
britanniques etlesautochtones avaientun entendementtres diff6rentde 'incidence
de la chaine d'alliance sur la souverainet6 autochtone, celles-ci ont toujours
reconnu le point de vue autochtone. Lorsque 'on examine I'ovolution de I'attitude
des autorit6 a 1'6gard de la chaine d'alliance a trois p6riodes distinctes (1763-
1765, 1783-1794, 1830-1860), on constate que cette reconnaissance officielle du
point de vue autochtone 6tait tant6t secondaire tant6tprimordiale. L 'interprotation
que font les historiens et les juristes des attitudes changeantes a 1'6gard des
trait6s a-t-elle men6 a des entendements differents de la notion de souverainet6
autochtone, c'est-a-dire du droit inh6rent des autochtones a l'autonomie.
Introduction
I. The Covenant Chain in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
1. Oral Tradition versus Written Records
2. Reconstructing A Shared Treaty-Meaning: Initial Steps
3. Identifying Theoretical Concerns: Lawyers versus Historians
II. Re-Interpreting the Covenant Chain Through the Marshall Lens:
Three Historical Periods Considered
1. 1763-1765: The Assertion of British Sovereignty over Canada
2. 1783-1794: The British Withdrawal From the American Mid-West
3. 1830-1860: The End of Imperial Control over Indian Affairs and
the Rusting of the Covenant Chain
Conclusions
Introduction
[W]e the said Sachims chief men Cap[tai]ns and representatives of the
Five Nations ... have lived peaceably and quietly with the people of
Albany our fellow subjects above eighty years when wee first made a firm
league and covenant chain with these Christians ... which covenant chain
hath been yearly renewed and kept bright and clear by all the Governours
successively and many neighbouring Governments of English and nations
of Indians have since upon their request been admitted into the same.
So reads the introductory passages of a "deed" made three hundred years
ago between the Five Nations, or Haudenosaunee, and officials repre-
senting King William III by which a land called "Canagariarchio" - now
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southern Ontario - was placed under the Crown's protection.' This text
purports to reflect the words of the sachems of the Five Nations; indeed,
the use of the aboriginal diplomatic metaphor concerning the formation
and annual brightening of the covenant chain suggests that perhaps it is
a transcription of oral statements made during negotiations. It may
therefore evoke the image of an eighteenth-century treaty conference,
complete with council fire, feathered chiefs, bewigged Englishmen,
lengthy orations, and exchanges of wampum strings.2 Of course, one
would have to include at the edge of this dramatic scene a figure with
quill, ink and parchment scribbling down the words as the sachems spoke,
producing this document that, so many years later, we still have. How-
ever, as one reads on the language of the deed changes, and so does the
image. "Wee... By these presents," the sachems say, "doe for us our heirs
and successors absolutely surrender, deliver up and for ever quit claime"
such-and-such land. The council-fire oratory is gone, and the language
begins instead to sound more like the conveyance of an easement over
"Blackacre," that ubiquitous English manor of common-law texts.3 Has
1. "Deed from the Five Nations to the King of their Beaver Hunting Ground" 19 July 1701,
in E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York
(Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1856-1861) vol. 4 at 908-911 [hereinafter Doc. Re. Colonial
Hist. N.Y.]. The 1701 deed recognized hunting rights in the territory, which were enforced in
R. v. Ireland(1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 577 (Gen. Div.).
2. Paintings and engravings of such scenes are numerous. See e.g., "Council between Indians
assembled and Colonel Henry Bouquet" (1764), painted by Benjamin West, reproduced in R.S.
Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in The Defence of Canada, 1774-1815
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992) at 99, or "Indian Council at Johnson Hall" (n.d.), painted by
E.L. Henry, reproduced in I.T. Kelsay, Joseph Brant, 1743-1807: Man of Two Worlds
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984) at 136.
3. The 1701 deed, supra note 1, is based upon the standard quit-claim deed used in common
law jurisdictions. For e.g., it provides:
To all Christian & Indian people ... to whom these presents shall come ... Wee ...
have freely and voluntarily surrendered delivered up and for ever quit claimed, and
by these presents doe for us our heirs and successors absolutely surrender, deliver
up and for ever quit claime unto our great Lord and Master the King of England.. all
the title and interest and all the claime and demand whatsoever which wee the said
five nations of Indians.. now have or ought to have of in or to all that vast Tract of
land or Colony called Canagariarchio....
Compare quit-claim precedent in J.D. Whetham, J.R. Runball & A.J. Milligan, eds., The
Standard Conveyancer: A Comprehensive Collection of Conveyancing Forms and Precedents
(Toronto: Burroughs & Co., 1925) at 954-55:
Now therefore this Indenture Witnesseth that the said party of the first part ... hath
granted, released and quitted claim and by these presents doth grant, release and quit
claim unto the said party of the second part, his heirs and successors forever, all the
estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever both at law and in equity
... in, to or out of and singular that certain parcel or tract of land and premises, lying
and being ... [description]....
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the council retired indoors to a comfortable parlour, and have the sachems
begun reading from a book of English real property precedents? Surely
not. Another, more plausible, image therefore springs to mind: the
council is over, or not yet begun, there are no sachems present, and the
scribe sits alone in the parlour with his book of precedents before him. In
this quiet solitude, the "treaty" is written.
4
That crown-aboriginal treaty texts were sometimes written before or
after agreements were actually reached in council is perhaps not surpris-
ing.5 Even the use of an English quit-claim precedent to express cross-
cultural, nation-to-nation agreements, though odd, is understandable -
common lawyers then (as now) were adept at applying existing forms to
novel circumstances. What is difficult to understand, however, is how
anyone today could be fooled into thinking that written texts such as the
1701 deed accurately reflect the actual agreements reached between
aboriginal nations and crown officials. Fortunately, the Supreme Court of
Canada's decision in R. v. Marshall6 now prevents such an approach to
the interpretation of crown-aboriginal treaties. Marshall is premised
upon the idea that treaties with aboriginal nations are not documents or
written instruments but rather are relationships - or, more precisely, they
represent a shared understanding of and commitment to a normative
framework for cross-cultural relationships. According to Marshall, the
identification of modem treaty meanings requires that the shared under-
standings of treaties that existed when they were made be discovered. To
this end the context of treaties - the rich narrative of aboriginal-crown
relations during the colonial era from which, as Robert A. Williams Jr.
writes, "a normative universe of shared meanings"7 emerged - may be as
4. In fact, the deed was drafted by Robert Livingston, Secretary of Indian Affairs for the
colony of New York, and signed after several days of conferences between Haudenosaunee
chiefs and the governor of New York: J.W. Brandgo and W.A. Starna, "The Treaties of 170 1:
A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy" (1996) 43 Ethnohistory 209 at 225.
5. A distinction should be made, however, between legal instruments like the 1701 deed,
signed after negotiations in council (see ibid.), and records or transcripts of council sessions
themselves, which (where they exist) do provide a far more direct, albeit still imperfect, account
of aboriginal meanings. See the transcript of council proceedings of July 14 and 19, 1701,
which led to the 1701 deed: P. Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs, Transacted in the
Colony of New York, 1678-1751 (1754), C.H. Mcllwain, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
1915) at 38-41. Even council minutes fail to capture fully the private negotiations that
inv ariably precededformal treaty coincils: 3.I. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators
on the Pennsylvania Frontier (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999) at 30-31, 254-55
[hereinafter Into the American Woods].
6. R. v. Marshall [No. I], [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter Marshall], See also R. v. Marshall
[No. 2], [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533.
7. R.A. Williams Jr., Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law and
Peace, 1600-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 47.
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important to the meaning of treaties as the written texts themselves.8 In
other words, in defining treaty meanings, we may leave the quiet solitude
of the scribe's parlour and return to the edge of the council fire to hear
what the parties were actually saying to each other.
The legal interpretation of old treaties after Marshall will not be easy.
The reconstruction of the normative universe occupied by colonists and
aboriginal peoples from ambiguous written sources and (where they
exist) aboriginal oral histories, represents a monumental interdiscipli-
nary, cross-cultural project in which historical, ethnohistorical, and
anthropological interpretations must be consolidated from a legal per-
spective that somehow reconciles aboriginal and non-aboriginal view-
points. There are many unresolved questions about the practical and
theoretical nature of this project.9 In this essay I consider just one of these
questions -namely, does the legal articulation of shared meanings for old
treaties involve a fundamentally different interpretative method than the
historical analysis of such treaties? I consider this theoretical question by
analyzing a concrete example: I explore the many meanings of the
"covenant chain" that linked - and may still link - the crown to the
aboriginal nations of the Great Lakes region. In particular, I will examine
the covenant chain as a treaty statement about sovereignty. In light of
Marshall there is now no reason in law to regard as accurate the statement
made by the sachems (or was it the scribe?) in the above-quoted 1701
deed that the Five Nations were subjects of the crown."° The question,
then, is whether it can now be said that there was a shared treaty-meaning
concerning the issue of sovereignty under the covenant chain.
8. See Marshall, supra note 6 per Binnie J. at 474: "The Court's obligation is to 'choose from
among the various possible interpretations of the common intention [when the treaty was made]
the one which best reconciles' the Mi'kmaq interests and those of the British Crown" (emphasis
in original). This approach was foreshadowed in R. v. Sioui, [ 199011 S.C.R. 1025 [hereinafter
Sioui], per Lamer J. at 1035: when reading treaties courts must "take into account the historical
context and perception of each party might have as to the nature of the undertaking contained
in the document"; and R. v. Badger, [ 199611 S.C.R. 771 at 798. See generally, J.Y. Henderson,
"Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties" (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 46.
9. For detailed analysis of the Marshall decisions see L. Rotman, "Marshalling Principles
From The Marshall Morass" (2000) 23 Dalhousie L.J. 5; R. Normey, "Angling for 'Common
Intention': Treaty Interpretation in R. v. Marshall" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 645; C. Bell & K.
Buss, "The Promise of Marshall on the Prairies: A Framework for Analyzing Unfulfilled
Treaty Promises" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 667.
10. It may have been the case that even Robert Livingston, who drafted the 170 t deed (supra
note 4), did not believe that it reflected aboriginal intentions. Elsewhere he wrote: "altho' the
French Governours are pleas'd to call their Indians, subjects of the French King, and our
Govemours in like manner call the Indians of the Five Nations Subjects of the Crown of
England, they [the Indians] do not so understand it, but look upon themselves in the state of
freedom," quoted in T.J. Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The
Albany Congress of 1754 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000) at 23-24.
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The analysis is reflective rather than argumentative: the objective is
not to identify the correct legal or historical interpretation of the covenant
chain but instead to consider the ways in which legal and historical
analyses may involve conflicting methodological assumptions about the
"normative universe" within which the covenant chain existed. Although
I focus upon the covenant chain and the issue of sovereignty, the
theoretical issues addressed are relevant to the interpretation of crown-
aboriginal treaties generally. Part I examines aboriginal and non-aborigi-
nal accounts of the covenant chain's initial meaning, and identifies the
nature of potential methodological differences between legal and histori-
cal interpretations. Part II considers British documentary sources relating
the covenant chain and the issue of sovereignty in more detail. The
documents are selected from three discrete time periods: the assertion of
British sovereignty over Canada in 1763-65; the withdrawal of British
sovereignty from the American mid-west in 1783-94; and the
reconfiguration of Indian policy in Canada in 1830-60. These were
periods of crisis that produced a heightened appreciation of aboriginal
perspectives about the British-Indian treaty relationship in imperial and
local officials, and hence particularly insightful and revealing statements
by them about what they thought aboriginal people thought the treaty
meant. Although these documents reveal that British perspectives on the
covenant chain were multi-dimensional and shifted to suit political
objectives, they also confirm that officials were cognizant of aboriginal
views of the treaty and of the tensions between British and aboriginal
views. In Part III, I consider the modem theoretical implications of this
conclusion for legal and historical interpretations of the shared meanings
of crown-aboriginal treaties.
I. The Covenant Chain in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
1. Oral Tradition versus Written Records
The covenant chain began as an "iron" chain treaty in the early seven-
teenth century between Dutch colonists and the Haudenosaunee confed-
eracy." The Haudenosaunee (People of the Longhouse), consisting of
the Mohawk, Seneca, Onondaga, Cayuga, Oneida and (from the 1720s)
Tuscorara nations, were called Iroquois by the French and the Five (later
Six) Nations by the British. After ousting the Dutch from what is now
11. F. Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of
Indian Tribes with English Colonies (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1984) at 47-57
[hereinafter Ambiguous Iroquois Empire]. M. Dennis, Cultivating A Landscape of Peace:
Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1993) at 268-69.
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New York state in 1664, English colonists held a council at Albany at
which the first gus-wen-tah - or two-row wampum belt - was given to
confirm the English-Five Nations iron chain. 2 In a treaty council in 1677,
in which a Mohawk speaker stated to the governor of New York that the
parties "were of one heart and one head (mind)," the relationship was
reconfirmed as a "silver" chain and thereafter was called the "silver
covenant chain," or simply the "covenant chain."' 3 The agreement was
essentially one of peace, alliance, trade and protection, but from the
aboriginal perspective it was informed by a degree of spiritual force as
well. The chain metaphor implied notional links of kinship, an extrapo-
lation of the clan unit that was the basic building block of local, national
and confederal aboriginal political organizations. 4 Its meaning was
therefore closely connected to pre-existing aboriginal concepts and
customs. However, the expression "chain" itself may have been an
English translation of an aboriginal expression that may have been more
closely conveyed by the imagery of linked or clasped arms; for English
officials, the links of a silver chain may have served their purposes better
than links formed by arms alone.' Even as a term, then, it seems that the
covenant chain was the result of a synthesis of words, concepts and
political aspirations derived from two very different linguistic and
cultural traditions.
The covenant chain began as a New York-Five Nations treaty, but with
the consolidation of Indian affairs in imperial hands in the 1750s, and the
extension of the chain to all the Great Lakes nations in the 1760s, it
became a generalized crown-aboriginal treaty relationship. After Britain
12. Articles of a Treaty made on 24 September 1664, in Doc. Re. Col. Hist. N.Y., supra note
1, vol. 3 at 67-68. See A.W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth
Century (New York: Kennikat Press, 1971) at 228. On wampum belts generally, see M.K.
Foster, "Another Look at the Function of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils" in F. Jennings,
ed., The History and Culture ofIroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties
of the Six Nations and their League (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985) at 99-114
[hereinafter History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy].
13. W.N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse: A Political History of the Iroquois
Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998) at 303, 301 [hereinafter Great
Law andthe Longhouse]. See also, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, supra note I I at 167 and D.K.
Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of
European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992) at 136-37
[hereinafter Ordeal of the Longhouse].
14. W.N. Fenton, "Structure, Continuity and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty
Making" [hereinafter "Structure, Continuity and Change"] in History and Culture ofIroquois
Diplomacy, supra note 12 at 12; Ordeal of the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 41.
15. R.L. Haan, "Covenant and Consensus: Iroquois and English, 1676-1760" in D.K. Richter
& J.H. Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbours in Indian
North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987) at 45 [hereinafter
Beyond the Covenant Chain]; Williams, Jr., supra note 7 at 52-53.
82 The Dalhousie Law Journal
defeated the French in Canada in 1759-60, councils were held to admit the
Ojibway, Mississauga, Algonquin, Huron, Ottawa and other nations in
possession of the Great Lakes region and territories beyond. This new
covenant chain was extended and confirmed between 1764 and 1766 in
the aftermath of Pontiac's War.16 As British officials at the time recog-
nized and as the Supreme Court of Canada recently acknowledged,
British-French transactions concerning Canada had no effect on British-
Indian relationships. 7 If there is a treaty basis to crown sovereignty over
this region and its indigenous inhabitants, the covenant chain is it.
Once the covenant chain is re-interpreted in light of Marshall, how-
ever, doubts arise about whether it can support the weight of British
claims to sovereignty. 8 By aboriginal oral tradition the covenant chain
secured a partnership between two independent peoples, not submission
by one to the sovereignty of the other. The two rows of purple shells found
in the gus-wen-tah represent the separate though parallel paths along
which aboriginal and non-aboriginal "vessels" travel; within their re-
spective vessels, nations "keep their government, their laws, their ways
and beliefs."' 9 The covenant chain may have extended crown protection
over aboriginal nations, but from their perspective they remained "inde-
pendent and sovereign. '2
By aboriginal tradition, the covenant chain did not "maintain itself'
but required "constant effort and renewal to keep it bright and shiny"
ensuring that it did not "rust."'2' The brightening of the chain was
16. J. Borrows, "Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History and
Self-Government" in M. Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law,
Equality and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 1997); J.W. Parmenter,
"Pontiac's War: Forging New Links in the Angto-troquois Covenant Chain, 1758-1766"
(1997) 44 Ethnohistory 617.
17. See e.g., T. Pownall, Administration of the Colonies (London: 1765) at 178:
We have seen that Sir William Johnson [Superintendent General of the imperial
Indian Department], although he took Niagarafrom the French by force of arms,
never considered this as a conquest of these landsfrom the Indians; but has agreeably
to his usual prudence and his perfect knowledge of Indian affairs, obtained by formal
treaty, a cession of these lands from the Indians to the crown of Great Britain.
See also Sioui, supra note 8 at 1063.
18. Of course, it did not take Marshall, supra note 6, to prompt such a critical reassessment
of British claims to sovereignty over the Great Lakes nations. See e.g. Borrows, supra note 16
at 169.
19. "Statement of the Haudensosaunee Concerning the Constitutional Framework and
International Position of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy" in Canada, House of Commons,
Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, Proceedings and Submissions, 32nd Parlia.,
I st Sess., 1983, No. 31 A, at 6-8 [hereinafter "Statement of the Haudensosaunee"]. See also D.
Johnston, "The Quest of the Six Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination" (1986) 44 U.
T. Fac. L. Rev. I at 11.
20. "Statement of the Haudensosaunee", ibid. at 9.
21. Ibid. at 7-8.
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achieved through nation-to-nation councils conducted according to elabo-
rate customary procedures. The customs included the preliminary "at
wood's edge" ceremony (to remove symbolic obstacles encountered in
travel) and the "ceremony of condolence" (to cover the dead and wipe
away tears), the kindling of the council fire, lengthy formal speeches
filled with metaphor and use of mnemonic devices, periods of private
deliberation and consultation, the giving of wampum strings or belts and
the exchange of presents.22 The meaning of diplomatic metaphors was
embedded deep within aboriginal culture and custom, and communica-
tion and agreement was therefore contingent upon effective translation
and interpretation. The father-child metaphor that was used to describe
crown-aboriginal relations beginning in the 1760s was sometimes wrongly
interpreted as a sign of aboriginal subjection to the crown; in fact, it
reflected aboriginal assumptions about the spiritual kinship link that was
forged between nations by compact, as well as aboriginal customs
regarding the responsibility of kindred members to protect and provide
for the more vulnerable of their number.
23
The brightening of the chain, then, was the customary institutional
manifestation of the treaty as a meaningful normative order. In many
respects, this institution was simply an extension into a cross-cultural
context of pre-existing customary constitutional forms. 24 The
Haudenosaunee constitution, the Ne' Gayanesha'gowa (Great Law of
Peace), established the Five Nations as a confederacy of self-governing
nations under which matters of common concern or disagreement were
resolved through appeals to accepted norms in the Ho-de-os'-seh
22. "Structure, Continuity and Change", supra note 14 at 6, 16,22-27. See also, M.R. Druke,
"Linking Arms: The Structure of Iroquois Intertribal Diplomacy" in Beyond the Covenant
Chain, supra note 15 at 35-38.
23. Druke, ibid. at 33-34; N.L. Hagedorn, "'A Friend To Go Between Them': The Interpreter
as Cultural Broker During Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-1770" (1988) 35 Ethnohistory 60;
R. White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region,
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at c. 2 [hereinafter The Middle
Ground]; N. Shoemaker, "An Alliance between Men: Gender Metaphors in Eighteenth
Century American Indian Diplomacy East of the Mississippi" (1999) 46 Ethnohistory 239 at
253-54; Parmenter, supra note 16 at 618-19, 636-37. See also "Glossary of Figures of Speech
in Iroquois Political Rhetoric" in History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, supra note 12
at 115-24.
24. Great Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 29; Linking Arms Together, supra note
7 at 119-20; Ordeal of the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 141.
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(confederal civil councils) rather than by war. 25 A shared understanding
of the Great Law was consistently confirmed in the Ho-de-os'-seh
through songs and oral recitations of principles symbolized by wampum
belts.2 6 The resolution of conflict through the restatement in council of
past commitments ensured that the confederal order evolved as a mean-
ingful normative framework capable of guiding member nations under
changing circumstances. If the crown-aboriginal covenant chain was
"legally" binding from the aboriginal perspective, it was probably in this
same sense: normativity was experienced through the perennial confir-
mation, or "brightening," of the chain at councils which addressed and
resolved differences through negotiation and present-giving, and defined
the shape and content of acceptable political behaviour. 7
Early English accounts of the covenant chain are similar in some
respects to aboriginal oral traditions. Impressed by the "Indian Genius in
the Arts of negotiating," Colden provided a detailed description of the
chain's evolution in his 1747 History of the Five Nations.8 According to
a 1698 memorandum, Europeans and "the Iroquaes or five Canton
Indians" had maintained good relations from the early seventeenth
century and "almost every yeare [they] sent down their Chiefe Sachems
and Captains" in order to "Receiv[e] the Antient peace and Covenant
25. A.C. Parker, ed., The Constitution of the Five.Nations, or The Iroquois Book of the Great
Law (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1916, N.Y. Museum Bulletin, No. 184);
L.H. Morgan, League of the Ho-de'-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois (Rochester: Sage & Brother,
1851) at 108. For more recent analysis asserting that Parker and Morgan present an overly
idealized picture of Iroquois confederal government, see D.K. Richter, "Ordeals of the
Longhouse: The Five Nations in Early American History" [hereinafter "Five Nations in Early
American History"] in Beyond the Covenant Chain, supra note 15 at 14-10; Ordeal of the
Longhouse, supra note 13 at 40; and, Great Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 4-5.
26. Parker, ibid. the Great Law of Peace was symbolized and recorded by wampum strings
(art. 55-56 at 44-45); when the confederate council decided to have "a reading of the belts of
shell calling to mind these laws" a special mat was to be made for the "speaker," a "formality"
"honouring the importance of the laws" (art. 62 at 48); whenever two chiefs from opposite sides
of the council fire desired "to hear the reciting of the laws of the Great Peace and so refresh their
memories," the Onondaga chiefs would convene a general council and appoint one chief "to
repeat the laws" (art. 63 at 48); the recitation was, it seems, a song, requiring an "expert speaker
and singer of the law" (art. 64 at 49).
27. On the derivation of covenant chain ceremonies from pre-existing aboriginal customs,
and in particular the Iroquois confederacy's Great Law of Peace, see Ordeal of the Longhouse,
supra note 13 at 141 and Great Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 12, 29-30, 308. For
a more general account of the emergence of a normative community through early aboriginal/
non-aboriginal relations see 1. Webber, "Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The
Emergence of Normative Community Between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples" (1995) 33
Osgoode Hall L.J. 623.
28. C. Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada, Which are dependent On
the Province of New-York in America, And Are the Barrier between the English and French
in that Part of the World (London: T. Osborne, 1727 (pt. 1), 1747 (pt. 2)) at pt. 2, 150
[hereinafter History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada].
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Chaine (soe called by them) ... making at all these Treaties presents to
each other."29 The renewing - or brightening - of the chain continued
throughout the eighteenth century. In 1753, for example, the imperial
Lords of Trade instructed colonial governors to "make proper Provision
... for renewing the Covenant Chain with the six Nations, and for making
such Presents to them as has been usual... ."30 It was essential to provide
these "favours" or presents annually, observed an official in 1764,
because "as amongst themselves a neglect of renewing their Treaties of
Friendship is looked on as an open violation of the peace of Nations .... 31
Though the covenant chain rituals persisted, the history of the British-
Five Nations relationship was hardly an even one. During the first half of
the eighteenth century the Five Nations pursued a policy of peace and
neutrality with the French and English. In the late 1740s, the chain was
strained almost to the breaking point only to be rescued and transformed
into an alliance against the French in the late 1750s. The character of the
chain changed after 1764 when it was extended to former French native
allies in the Great Lakes region, and changed again after some nations
sided against Britain in the American revolution.32 Despite its evolution,
the customary ceremonies of the brightening process continued. As will
be seen in Part II below, annual present-giving councils remained a
central feature of crown-aboriginal relations in Canada until 1858.
Though similar in many respects, the aboriginal and non-aboriginal
accounts of the covenant chain in the seventeenth century diverge on the
question of sovereignty. The author of the 1698 memorandum stated:
I myselfe have been present in many of these treaties for the space of neare
forty yeares past, where the said Indians, or five Canton Indian nations
have often declared their Submission to the Government of this province,
and Desired to be protected by the same against the ffrench of Canada,
Comparing the said Government to a Great large tree, under whose
branches they Desire to Shelter .... 3
29. "Memorial presented to the Earl of Bellomont by Coll Bayard relating to the Right of the
Crown of England to the Sovereignty over the Five Nations of Indians. New Yorke, July 6
1698" [hereinafter "Memorial presented to the Earl of Bellomont"], National Archives of
Canada, Ottawa [hereinafter NA] MG 21 Lansdowne MSS 849, file 77 at 66-67.
30. Lords of Trade to Jonathan Belcher, Governor of New Jersey, 18 September 1753, Public
Record Office, London, U.K. [hereinafter PRO] CO 324/15 at 171-2. Similar letters went to
Virginia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maryland and Pennsylvania.
31. George Croghan to Board of Trade, January 1764, in Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., supra note
1, vol. 7 at 602-604.
32. Ordeal of the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 214-54 (on neutrality), 272 (Mohawk chief
Hendrick declares the chain "broken" in 1753); Great Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13
at 450, 512 (on abandonment of neutrality and transformation of chain into alliance against
French); The Middle Ground, supra note 23 at 315-66 (on post-1766 developments); Allen,
supra note 2 at 46 (on post- 1783 developments).
33. "Memorial presented to the Earl of Bellomont", supra note 29 (emphasis added).
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The protective-tree metaphor was drawn from aboriginal oral traditions
- it is a key metaphor in the Haudenosaunee Ne' Gayanesha 'gowa3 4 - but
the inference of submission conflicts with the equality of nations central
to the aboriginal perspective. Nevertheless, written treaty records com-
monly include assertions of crown sovereignty and aboriginal submis-
sion. At a 1684 council Onondaga and Cayuga chiefs were reported as
stating: "We have submitted our Selves to the Great Sachem Charles [i.e.,
King Charles II] who liveth on the other side of the Great Lakes...."" The
transcript for a 1689 council includes the entry: "Next Spoke the Indi-
ans... [who acknowledged] That they are Subjects of the King of
England.... 36 Assertions of crown sovereignty over the Five Nations
appear in other treaty entries37 as well as other state papers, including
British representations to France,38 Board of Trade reports,39 a British-
French treaty,40 and royal instructions to governors.41 Finally, it may be
argued that the reported cases and legal opinions from this time suggest
that English and colonial courts would have regarded the written treaty
34. Parker, supra note 25, art. I at 30 "I am Dekanawidah and with the Five Nations'
Confederate Lords I plant the Tree of the Great Peace .... Under the shade of this Tree ... shall
you sit and watch the Council Fire of the Confederacy ... and all the affairs of the Five Nations
shall be transacted at this place...."
35. Wraxall, supra note 5 at 11-12 (Council of 2 August 1684). The Five Nations were
internally divided between "anglophiles," "francophiles" and "neutralists" at this time, and
chiefs from the latter two camps were especially critical of English assertions of dominance in
such treaty conferences: Ordeal of the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 151-60.
36. Wraxall, ibid. at 14-15 (Council of 3 February 1689).
37. Ibid. at 9-10 (Council of 21 July 1679: the Mohawk delegation was said to have
"acknowledgeldi themselves to be under this Government [and] renew[ed] the Chain of Peace
& Friendship ... [the Governor said] the French have no Authority over you"); at 13 (Council
of 5 August 1684: Governor Dongan (New York) chastises the Five Nations for treating with
the French, "wch as Subjects of His Britannick Majesty they ought not to have done"); at 32
(Council of 12 June 1699: "you are the Subjects of the Great King of England underwhose Govt
you have been time out of Mind, and the Covenant Chain hath been so often renewed with this
Govt that there is none living can remember the beginning of it"); at 88 (Council of 19 June
1711: "the Queens Arms are a Sign of her Sovereingty wch he [the governor] hopes they will
be always ready to defend....").
38. Report of negotiations in Canada, 2 July 1698, in Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., supra note 1,
vol. 4 at 349; Earl Bellomoot to Count de Frontenac, 13 August 1698, in Doc. Rel. Col. Hist.
N.Y., supra note 1, vol. 4 at 367.
39. Board of Trade to the King, 2 June 1709, in Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N.Y., supra note 1, vol.
5 at 75.
40. Treaty of Utrecht, 713, in W. Houston, ed., Documents Illustrative of the Canadian
Constitution (Toronto: Carswell, 1891) at 3-5 (§ 15: Five Nations are "subject to the Dominion
of Great Britain").
41. Royal Instructions to New York governors from 1690 to 1770 provided that the Five
Nations were to renew "their submission to our government" yearly and be protected "as our
subjects": L.W. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776
(London: Appleton-Century, 1935) vol. 2 at §§666-67.
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assertions of crown sovereignty as determinative42 and may even have
regarded aboriginal peoples as "Barbarians" or "infidels" excluded from
the benefits of the rule of law altogether.43
2. Reconstructing A Shared Treaty-Meaning: Initial Steps
On the issue of sovereignty, then, aboriginal oral accounts and non-
aboriginal written accounts of the covenant chain are very different - the
parties did not appear to be "of one heart and one head."' The identifi-
cation today of a shared understanding of the treaty as it related to
sovereignty therefore involves constructing an interpretation of the
treaty's meaning that finds coherence and reconciliation between posi-
tions that appear to be contradictory.45 Although I do not attempt to
construct that interpretation here, it is worthwhile to identify the steps that
might be taken in doing so. One approach might be to suggest ways in
which the covenant chain could have been, in a general sense, a normative
foundation for a common crown-aboriginal understanding about sover-
eignty, and then proceed to seek specific evidence that there was -
notwithstanding the apparent divergence of views noted above - a
"meeting of minds" on a particular conception of sovereignty. One might
begin by re-considering the juridical concept of "sovereignty" itself. It
might be acknowledged, for example, that although the (supposed)
European conception of sovereignty of the time - the notion of an
absolute "Hobbesian" authority capable of issuing and coercively enforc-
ing commands to the people of a particular territory46 - may not have been
42. Just a few years after the covenant chain was established, the Court of Common Pleas held
in Craw v. Ramsey (1669), Vaugh 274 at 288, that courts should refer, with the King's
permission, to the "roll," or official written record, containing the appropriate "treaty" to see
if a foreign people had been made subjects of the Crown, referring expressly to British North
America as an example ("[t]he like may now happen in Virginia, Surenam, or other places, part
of which are in the King's liegeance, part not").
43. Opinion by Counsel c. 1675, printed in Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N. Y., supra note 1, vol. 8 at
486 and quoted in Regina v. St. Catharines Milling Co. (1885), 10 OR. 196 (Ch.) at 206-208
(referring to "Barbarians"); Calvin's Case (1608), 7 Co. Rep. Ia at 17b ("infidels" subjected
to King's discretionary authority); Butts v. Penny (1677), 2 Lev. 201 (trover lies to recover a
slave because "the Negroes were infidels, and the subjects of an infidel prince"); East-India
Company v. Sandys (1683-85), 10 St. Tr. 371 per Holt (as counsel) at 374 ("infidels.. .[are]
excluded.. .from the benefit of the law").
44. Supra note 13.
45. An alternative might be to disregard the written treaty text altogether on the basis that it
is wholly inaccurate. Whether the broad contextual approach to treaty interpretation adopted
by the Supreme Court of Canada allows such an approach is still an open question. Although
I think that this approach may be required in some cases, I will conclude in Part III below that
an interpretation of the covenant chain may be possible that accommodates both written and
oral versions.
46. See G. Williams, Salmond on Jurisprudence, 1 1 th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1957)
at 517; D.E.C. Yale, "Hobbes and Hale on Law, Legislation and the Sovereign" (1972) 31
Cambridge L.J. 121.
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shared by aboriginal nations - which were generally organized around
clan or kindred units governed by customary norms and non-coercive
councils 47 - a shared understanding about sovereignty could still have
been developed in the seventeenth century. The pre-existing Ne'
Gayanesha'gowa acknowledged as inherent in each of the member
nations of the confederacy a freedom to regulate its own internal affairs,
48
and pre-existing British law relating to imperial expansion indicated that
the crown acknowledged customary or prescriptive rights of internal
sovereignty (jura regalia) in constitutional units, like counties palatine,
which were strategically located at the edges of the imperial frontier.4 9 In
short, aboriginal and non-aboriginal conceptions of "sovereignty" under
the covenant chain may not have been mutually exclusive: common
conceptual ground may well have existed upon which a shared under-
standing of sovereignty under the covenant chain may now be con-
structed.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the covenant chain could have
provided a normative foundation for this shared understanding of sover-
eignty. It was suggested above that aboriginal nations likely regarded the
chain's legal meaning and authority as manifested in the brightening
process, whereas English judges may have focused upon the written texts
of the treaty and concluded that it was an assertion of crown sovereignty
that secured no justiciable rights for aboriginal peoples. This latter
conclusion, however, is based upon very narrow jurisprudential assump-
tions. If the covenant chain's authority arose from participation by parties
47. For a discussion of pre-contact aboriginal law and government in the Great Lakes region,
see M.D. Walters, "'According to the Old Customs of Our Nation': Aboriginal Self-
Government on the Credit River Mississauga Reserve, 1826-1847" (1999) 30 Ottawa L. Rev.
I at 6-14 [hereinafter "According to the Old Customs of Our Nation"]. For more generalized
discussions, see M.S. Marule, "Traditional Indian Government: Of the People, by the People,
for the People" in Leroy Little Bear, M. Boldt & J. A. Long, eds., Pathways to Self-
Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1984) at 36-45, and M. Boldt & J.A. Long, "Tribal Traditions and European-Western
Political Ideologies: The Dilemma of Canada's Native Indians" (1984) 17 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 537.
48. The Great Law of Peace provided that matters of common concern were addressed by the
confederal council, but it also provided: "Before the real people united their nations, each
nation had its council fires. Before the Great Peace their councils were held. The five Council
Fires shall continue to burn as before and ... [t]he Lords of each nation in future shall settle their
nation's affairs.: Parker, supra note 25, art. 97 at 55-56.
49. Cotton v. Johnson (1689), 3 Salk. 110 (counties palatine may arise "by prescription"
giving the owner "jura regalia, and a King-like power"). See generally Le Case del Countie
Palatine de Wexford( 1612), Davis 58; SirE. Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes ofthe Laws
of England (London: R. Brooke, 1797) at 204-205; Sir M. Hale, The Prerogatives of the King,
D.E.C. Yale, ed., (London: Selden Society, 1976) at 211-14; SirW. Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765; reprint, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1979) at 116-17.
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within the norm-generating and norm-confirming exercise of "brighten-
ing" the chain, then it can be argued that it constituted an "inter-societal"
law,50 or "multicultural nomos,"' separate from the municipal laws of
England or particular colonies but acknowledged by British imperial
law.52 Of course, the British tendency to equate "law" with decisions of
courts obscures the legal regime within which the covenant chain existed,
for that regime did not produce "judgments" of the sort then (or now)
familiar to common lawyers. If evidence of judicial enforcement of
crown-aboriginal treaty norms is deemed necessary for their character-
ization as "law" then some evidence can be found (e.g. the creation in
1664 by the imperial crown of an ad hoc tribunal empowered to "take
effectuall course" to ensure that "Treatyes or Contracts" made with native
"Kings" were "punctually performed" and "full reparation and satisfac-
tion" paid for breaches).53 However, once it is acknowledged that the
covenant-chain customs of the brightening council had normative force
for both parties - that political action really was constrained by these
customs in a meaningful way - then nothing further should be required
to demonstrate the authority of the covenant chain within the unique
cross-cultural legal order that governed crown-aboriginal relations of the
colonial era.
In short, by reconsidering the meanings of "sovereignty" and "law"
and by taking a broad contextual approach to interpreting treaties and
juridical concepts, emphasizing customs and practices over literal read-
ings of written texts such as treaty records or case reports, that which at
first appeared irreconcilable now appears reconcilable. The
(re)construction of the elusive shared meaning of the covenant chain that
Marshall mandates has begun. The next step in the analysis is to seek
evidence of a "meeting of minds" upon a specific conception of sover-
eignty under the chain. Part of this process requires a careful examination
of British documentary sources in order to determine whether aboriginal
50. B. Slattery, "Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J.
681 at 691; B. Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at
736-37.
51. Williams, Jr., supra note 7 at 51; also at 28-29 (it was part of a "multicultural
jurisgenesis").
52. M.D. Walters, "The 'Golden Thread' of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common
Law and Under the Consitution Act, 1982" (1999)44 McGill L.I. 711 at 718-35 [hereinafter
"Golden Thread of Continuity"].
53. "Instructions to ye Commissrs. to visite ye Colony of ye Massachusetts..." (1664), PRO
CO 324/1 at 230-32. See generally M.D. Walters, "Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-
1773) and the Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Laws and Government in British North
America" (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 785 at 809-810 [hereinafter "Mohegan Indians v.
Connecticut"].
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traditions concerning the chain were understood by British officials and/
or influenced British policy in any way. These issues are discussed in Part
II below. First, however, it is important to define in more precise terms
the theoretical problems raised by the interpretative process itself.
3. Identifying Theoretical Concerns: Lawyers versus Historians
In one sense, the task of constructing shared meaning involves interpre-
tative methods similar to those used by common-law lawyers in the
process of (for example) interpreting conflicting lines of case law,
reconciling contradictory statutory provisions, and, of course, locating
the consensus ad idem underlying a contract about which parties dis-
agree. The integration of superficially discordant rules, principles and
facts into a coherent normative system by interpretative processes of
analogising, distinguishing, classifying, inferring, and extrapolating is
the key feature of common-law reasoning. It represents an interpretative
dimension within which the importance of distinctions between law and
fact, past and present, and is and ought are discounted in favour of one
overriding objective: a coherent normative order that produces just
results for litigants today in light of the commitments society has made
in the past. Seen from this perspective, the reconstruction of a shared
meaning for a treaty - even one several centuries old - through the
reinterpretation of both context and concepts makes sense.
However, to the historian of law and politics - even an ethnohistorian
specializing in the post-contact history of indigenous peoples - this
reconstruction project may not make sense. An historian may be reluctant
to engage in the interpretative exercise of constructing a shared under-
standing of an old treaty if, upon examining the "record," he or she
concludes that, in fact, none existed. If parties to a treaty developed
different, self-interested definitions of its meaning then that is a historical
fact that such an historian would presumably seek to expose and explain,
not to obscure through the development of a hypothetical "shared
understanding" that did not exist.
The following statements of two leading scholars of aboriginal
ethnohistory in the Great-Lakes region are instructive in this respect. In
explaining his interpretative technique of cultural "upstreaming"-the
tracing back of present native oral traditions through past non-native
documentary records in order to corroborate those traditions and better
understand past documents-William N. Fenton states:
My interest in the treaties is scholarly. In them I seek to trace the roots of
customs that I have observed among the living Iroquois of this century, and
with these observations I hope to illuminate the past. The quest is
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ethnological and historical. Litigation of treaty claims, or defence against
such claims, is not my concern.1
4
Likewise, Bruce Trigger has observed that the goal of ethnohistory is
essentially that of orthodox (non-native) history: to provide an objective
explication of the past." Indeed, it is this pursuit of objectivity that gave
rise to a unique ethnohistoical perspective. This perspective recognizes
that the post-contact history of non-literate native peoples could only be
identified accurately through non-native documentary sources if those
sources were read critically in light of anthropological, ethnological,
linguistic, and archaeological findings, as well as oral histories of native
peoples themselves.5 6 The pursuit of objectivity also explains why some
(non-native) ethnohistorians are wary about some native oral histories.
Insofar as native oral histories collapse ideas about past, present and
future into a holistic, supernatural account of a community's story, says
Trigger, they are inconsistent with the linear and "scientific" premises of
ethnohistory, and therefore are of limited value in the ethnohistorical
explication of past events unless supported by other empirical data.
7
54. "Structure, Continuity and Change", supra note 14 at 3. Compare S.E. Patterson,
"Anatomy of a Treaty: Nova Scotia's First Native Treaty in Historical Context" (1999) 48
U.N.B.L.J. 41 at 41, 64 (defining crown-aboriginal treaties raise "historical rather than legal
questions" and "[ulnless the courts can find a way to breathe new life into old treaties, the
treaties of Boston and Annapolis are interesting historical artefacts but they lack the evidentiary
support they would need to be viewed as valid treaties today"). On "upstreaming," see D.K.
Richter, "Up the Cultural Stream: Three Recent Works in Iroquois Studies" (1985) 32
Ethnohistory 636 at 365 [hereinafter "Up the Cultural Stream"]. This method can be applied
to treaty interpretation: W.C. Wicken, "'Heard It From Our Grandfathers': Mi'kmaq Treaty
Traditions and the Syliboy Case of 1928" (1995) 44 U.N.B.L.I. 145 at t54-55.
55. B. Trigger, "Ethnohistory: The Unfinished Edifice" (1986) 33 Ethnohistory 253 at 263
[hereinafter "Unfinished Edifice"]. For general accounts of non-native historical methodology,
see e.g., R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946); E.H.
Carr, What is History? (New York: Random House, 1961); E. Hobsbawm, On History
(London: Abacus, 1997), and on ethnohistorical method in particular, see J. Axtell, "The
Ethnohistory of Native America" in D.L. Fixico, ed., Rethinking American Indian History
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997) at 11-27.
56. "Unfinished Edifice", ibid. at 263. Also B. Trigger, "Ethnohistory: Problems and
Prospects" (1982) 29 Ethnohistory 1 at 3 [hereinafter "Problems and Prospects"] and R.
Thorton, "Institutional and Intellectual Histories of Native American Studies" in R. Thorton,
ed., Studying Native America: Problems and Prospects (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1998) 79 at 93.
57. "Problems and Prospects", ibid. at 6-7. For the holistic native approach to history see e.g.
Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the Relationship, vol.
1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 32-36. For contrary approaches to Trigger
that emphasize oral history and native perspective, see A.C. Wilson, "Power of the Spoken
Word: Native Oral Traditions in American Indian History" in Fixico, supra note 55 at 101-116
and C. Martin, "The Metaphysics of Writing Indian-White History" in C.Martin, ed., The
American Indian and the Problem of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) at
27-34.
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Furthermore, Trigger argues, native oral histories should not be used for
partisan or political purposes:
[Historians must avoid] the temptation to twist the findings ofethnohistorical
research to suit the aims of political movements .... Public wrongs cannot
be .. excused merely be rewriting history.. .If professional historians
allow a past-as-wished-for to subvert their endeavour to understand the
past as it really was, they will fail to provide a valid, and hence a useful,
guide to understanding past relations between Euroamericans and native
peoples.58
For ethnohistorians like Fenton and Trigger, then, the entire project of
(re)constructing shared treaty-meanings through the (re)interpretation of
both aboriginal oral histories and non-aboriginal written sources, with a
view to identifying a legal treaty meaning for the resolution of modem-
day litigation, may be inappropriate.
In fact, the founding of the discipline of ethnohistory in the 1940s and
the proliferation of historical analyses of native societies in North
America beginning in the 1970s were largely responses by historians to
modern aboriginal political and legal claims.5 9 Even so, the views of
Fenton and Trigger contrast sharply with those of legal scholars like
Robert Williams Jr. and James Youngblood Henderson. Williams pre-
sents native oral traditions and customs concerning treaties of the colonial
era (including the covenant chain) as an independent and meaningful
source of legal principles that ought to be regarded as relevant to the
resolution of modem legal problems. Says Williams:
[A]s a legal scholar, I concede that I have immediate concerns in mind
when I examine the history of legal thought in the European conquest of
the Indian in America .... [T]he reemergence of the Two Row Wampum ...
is not an isolated story of the continuing relevance of tribal traditions in the
contemporary indigenous rights movement .... 60
For Henderson old treaties must be read in light of aboriginal languages,
oral traditions, and legal orders existing when treaties were made if they
are to be interpreted properly "to promote the new constitutional order of
Canada.'61 Williams and Henderson are clearly engaged in a very
58. "Problems and Prospects", supra note 56 at 8. For similar statements, see Hobsbawm,
supra note 55 at 10, W.E. Washburn, "Distinguishing History from Moral Philosophy and
Public Advocacy" in Martin, ibid. at 91-97, and R. White, "Using the Past: History and Native
American Studies" in Thorton, supra note 56 at 236.
59. M.L. Meyer & K. Lee Klein, "Native American Studies and the End of Ethnohistory" in
Thorton, supra note 56, 182-216 at 185, and K. Coates, "Writing First Nations into Canadian
History: A Review of Recent Scholarly Work" (2000) 81 Can. Hist. Rev. 99 at 99.
60. Williams, Jr., supra note 7 at 4-5.
61 "Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties", supra note 8 at 64-74, 95. For another legal scholar
adopting this approach see B. Wildsmith, "Treaty Responsibilities: A Co-Relational Model"
(1992) 26 U.B.C. L. Rev. 324 at 326.
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different interpretative project than Fenton and Trigger; it appears as
though serious tensions exist between historical and legal interpretations
of old treaties. Still, these differences should not be overemphasized.
Some historians argue that historical scholarship must be crafted with an
eye on its modem legal implications for aboriginal peoples.62 Further-
more, both forms of interpretation noted above purport to be premised
upon genuine fidelity to historical materials and commitments. Indeed,
Williams' and Henderson's legal arguments would collapse without the
historical foundations they build. It is therefore important to be precise
about the points at which the historian's and the lawyer's fidelity to
historical materials and commitments may take different interpretative
forms.
The most important difference between historical and legal interpre-
tative method is that between reading law historically, as empirical fact,
and reading it legally, as part of a normative system. 63 For example, a
legal historian examining nineteenth-century case law might conclude
that, as an empirical fact, aboriginal title was not then acknowledged at
common law in Canada, but a lawyer today would have to conclude that
the common law in Canada does now, and always has, acknowledged
aboriginal title.64 Similarly, a legal historian might conclude that it was
the original intent of the framers of the British North America Act, 1867
to divide legislative power in Canada exclusively between provincial and
federal legislatures, but a lawyer today might conclude that the BNA Act
does not, and never did, affect the inherent legislative powers enjoyed by
First Nations. 65 These legal arguments concerning common law and
constitutional meanings do not ignore empirical-historical statements
about the law; on the contrary, their success as legal arguments depends
in part upon demonstrating that the empirical statements of law identified
by legal historians are, and were, wrong according to the relevant
normative legal standard. From a legal perspective, however, the relevant
normative standard is an amalgam of historic commitments interpreted
today with a view to the coherence - or, as Dworkin would say, the
"integrity" - of the present legal order. Cases and constitutions, even if
62. See e.g. R. Brownlie and M. Kelm, "Desperately Seeking Absolution: Native Agency as
Colonialist Alibi?" (1994) 75 Can. Hist. Rev. 543.
63. E.g. J. Finnis, "The Fairy Tale's Moral" (1998) 115 L.Q. Rev. 170 at 170.
64. St. Catherine Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.); Calder
v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R.
1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw].
65. See e.g., the interpretation of the British North America Act, 1867 [now Constitution Act,
1867] U.K. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 in Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000]
B.C.J. No. 1524 (Q.L.) (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Campbell].
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first posited centuries ago, are not historical artifacts but present-day
norms affecting living people, and legal reasoning about their meanings
is (unlike historical interpretation) a form of "practical reasoning."'
Treaties could be read in Canadian law like cases or constitutions, the
meanings of which shift with normative context regardless of the "origi-
nal intent" of the parties or "framers." Indeed, in relation to certain other
aboriginal rights, the Supreme Court of Canada has rejected even this
form of historically constraining legal interpretation and has fashioned
new rules from first principles in a wholly modem context.67 However,
in Canadian law at present treaties are not interpreted as mere platforms
upon which modem rights can be judicially constructed from first
principles; nor are they treated, at present, like cases or constitutions as
"living trees" independent of "original intent." Instead, they are treated
in Canadian law as a species of contract, or agreement, for which the
original intent of the parties is not only relevant but central to the
identification of legal meaning.6" Although the historic treaty right, once
found, can be exercised in a modem context (e.g., a right to fish for
"necessaries" is, today, a right to fish for a "moderate livelihood"),69 the
inquiry purports to be primarily an historical one. While courts do not
usually rely upon historical evidence presented by expert witnesses when
interpreting old cases or constitutional provisions, since they are laws not
facts, courts must consider such evidence when interpreting old treaties;
shared treaty-meanings appear to be treated as facts and not laws.
In short, the principal distinction between legal and historical interpre-
tative technique appears not to be relevant to the identification of shared
treaty-meanings. Both judges and historians appear to be operating in the
same interpretative dimension, both asking and seeking to answer the
same sort of factual question by reference to the same sort of empirical
data. Even so, there are a number of reasons why judges and historians
may answer this question differently. Four reasons for this difference in
approach may be identified in particular, two of which are practical and
two of which are theoretical in nature.
66. Legal reasoning is a form of practical reasoning insofar as it involves identification of
reasons for acting (or norms): J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1980) at 15; R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1987) at 13-14 (and
on law as "integrity" see c. 7).
67. They have done so in relation to certain sorts of non-treaty aboriginal rights: "Golden
Thread of Continuity", supra note 52.
68. "Interpreting Sui Generis Treaties", supra note 8 at 72.
69. Marshall, supra note 6 at 501-502.
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First, a judge unfamiliar with historical issues may misunderstand
documents and expert testimony and therefore define the shared meaning
of a treaty differently than an historian due to a genuine mistake about the
empirical data.70 Second, ajudge may understand the historical evidence
but that evidence may contain gaps that historians are unwilling to fill by
inference; in such cases, the judge may, in order to render judgment in the
case, make a decision about what happened that an historian concerned
about professional integrity could not make.7 Third, judges and non-
native historians may approach native oral history differently. A non-
native ethnohistorian like Trigger may refuse to weigh oral history
equally with other historical data unless it is corroborated by other data,
but Canadian law may now require that judges give oral history equal
weight with other sources, especially when it is not corroborated by other
sources. 
7 2
For the purposes of this analysis, these three examples of how judicial
and historical interpretations of shared treaty-meanings may differ are
not important. The first issue can be assumed not to arise. As will be seen
in Part II below, the second issue is also immaterial: while more evidence
would be useful in identifying perspectives on the chain, it is fair to say
that there is no gap in evidence about how parties viewed the covenant
chain which historians would refuse to fill, just conflict between those
views. Finally, the question of oral history - which presents fascinating
and complex theoretical problems for law and history - may not be a
significant source of tension between legal and historical interpretations
of the covenant chain, for - as Part II below suggests - aboriginal oral
traditions concerning its meaning were manifested in the written record.
This is not to say that oral histories regarding the covenant chain are
unimportant. Indeed, it is worth emphasizing that although ethnohistorians
credit Francis Jennings with rediscovering and rescuing from obscurity
the covenant chain in his 1984 book, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire:
The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colo-
70. Thus, the Crown's expert historian in Marshall, supra note 6, Professor Stephen
Patterson, argues that the Supreme Court misunderstood the empirical data by inferring treaty
terms for one aboriginal community from a treaty made with another aboriginal community:
Patterson, "The Marshall Decision As Seen By An 'Expert Witness"' ("1999 Constitutional
Cases: An Analysis of the 1999 Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada",
Osgoode Hall Law School Professional Development Programme, 7 April 2000) [unpublished].
See also W.C. Wicken, "The Mi'kmaq and Wuastukwiuk Treaties" (1994) 43 U.N.B.L.J. 241
at 241 [hereinafter "The Mi'kmaq and Wuastukwiuk Treaties"].
71. D. Bourgeois, "The Role of the Historian in the Litigation Process" (1986) 67 Can. His.
Rev. 195 at 197; G.M. Dickson & R.D. Gidney, "History and Advocacy: Some Reflections on
the Historian's Role in Litigation" (1987) 68 Can. His. Rev. 576 at 580-581; Marshall, supra
note 6 at para. 37.
72. Delgamuukw, supra note 64 at paras. 84-87. On Trigger's views, see supra notes 55-58.
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nies,7 for the Haudenosaunee the covenant chain was hardly in need of
rescuing: it has always been central to their oral traditions and to their
claims against non-native authorities.74 The point is simply that the
identification of a shared meaning of sovereignty under the covenant
chain is probably not an example of a dispute about treaty meaning in
which having to give aboriginal oral history equal weight will alter
judicial interpretation from historical interpretation. In light of the
manner in which aboriginal traditions were clearly reflected within the
written record even an ethnohistorian like Trigger who seems wary about
oral history would still have to give those traditions full evidentiary
weight.
Even if none of these three reasons for differences between legal and
historical interpretations of shared treaty-meanings arise, there may be a
fourth reason, which I explore in more detail in Part III below. For now
it is sufficient to observe that even if the law regards treaty meanings as
historical facts to be proven by empirical data, it must also account for the
existence of these historical facts as historical norms. As such they cannot
be defined without a form of normative or practical reasoning. A reason
why legal and historical interpretations of historical treaty-meanings may
differ is that lawyers and historians may differ upon the extent to which
treaty meanings can now be characterized as both historical facts and
historical norms. To demonstrate how evolving definitions of the cov-
enant chain help illustrate this point, it is necessary first to consider the
documentary record surrounding the covenant chain as it developed over
time, seeking within it both British and aboriginal conceptions of its
meaning.
II. Re-Interpreting the Covenant Chain Through the Marshall Lens:
Three Historical Periods Considered
The following analysis considers British documentary sources of both a
legal and political nature in an attempt to determine how the British
conceived of their treaty relationship with aboriginal nations in the Great
Lakes region, and whether these conceptions conflicted with or comple-
mented native oral traditions concerning the covenant chain and the issue
73. Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, supra note 11. For assessments of Jennings's contribution
in this respect see "Up the Cultural Stream", supra note 54 at 367; J.H. Merrell, "Review of
Ambiguous Iroquois Empire" (1985) 71 J. of Am. Hist. 853.
74. This point is confirmed by Part H below in relation to the seventeenth to nineteenth
centuries. In the twentieth century, the covenant chain was the basis of two important
submissions, made in 1924 and 1983 respectively: "Appeal of the 'Six Nations' to the League"
in League of Nations Official Journal (June, 1924) vol. 6 at 829, and "Statement of the
Haudensosaunee", supra note 19.
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of sovereignty. The covenant chain was a dynamic, on-going treaty
relationship, and therefore I have assumed that the identification of its
shared meaning requires consideration of how its meaning developed
over time.75 For each of the three historical periods examined, statements
by political actors are considered first, followed by a brief consideration
of legal principles that might have been relevant to the determination of
the covenant chain's British legal status during the historical period in
question.
1. 1763-1765: The Assertion of British Sovereignty over Canada
Sir William Johnson was the Superintendent General of the imperial
Indian Department (Northern District) from the mid- 1750s until his death
in 1774.76 His nephew, Guy Johnson, and then his son Sir John Johnson,
succeeded him in office, the latter Johnson occupying the position of
Superintendent General of the Indian Department for Upper and Lower
Canada until 1828. 77 William Johnson lived in close proximity to the
Mohawks in the colony of New York, and he understood (as well as any
eighteenth-century British official could) their language, politics, cus-
toms and culture. He was accepted in both non-native and native worlds,
earning a baronetcy from George II and the Mohawk name Warraghiyagey
from the Six Nations. Johnson's second wife, Molly Brant (Joseph
Brant's sister) was Mohawk, but like other powerful Europeans of the
time, Johnson was actively involved in legally and morally questionable
speculation involving aboriginal lands.7"
Johnson's contribution to Indian policy in British North America was
profound. It has been said that Johnson's views formed "the foundation"
of that policy,79 that he "spoke for England" in Indian matters, 0 and that
he was "the most critical figure" in Indian policy development.," His
75. It mustbe acknowledged that, as G. Christie, "Justifying Principles ofTreaty Interpretation"
(2000) 26 Queen's L.J. 143 at 152-57, observes, Canadian courts have tended to interpret
treaties as one-off surrenders or submissions rather than as constitutional frameworks regulating
on-going relations.
76. See generally, F.W. Seymour, Lords of the Valley: Sir William Johnson and his Mohawk
Brothers (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1930); J.T. Flexner, Mohawk Baronet: Sir
William Johnson of New York (New York: Harper, 1959); Allen, supra note 2 at 22-30.
77. C. Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1987) at 52-53.
78. Kelsay, supra note 2 at 68-70.
79. D.C. Scott, "Indian Affairs, 1763-1841" in A. Shortt et al., eds., Canada and Its Provinces
(Toronto: Glasgow, Brook & Co., 1914-1917) vol. 3 at 698.
80. R.S. Allen, A History of the British Indian Department in North America (1755-1830)
(Ottawa: National Historic Sites Service, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, 1971) at 14.
81. The Middle Ground, supra note 23 at 223.
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opinions concerning the legal status of aboriginal peoples and their land
rights correspond closely with the structure of American law as it was
later developed by the United States Supreme Court in the classic
decisions of the nineteenth century on Indian title and self-government.
Marshall C.J.'s conclusions in Johnson v. M'Intosh8' and Worcester v.
Georgia83 - that discovery gave Britain title over North America as
against other European states but Indian nations retained legal rights to
land and self-government until divested of them by conquest or treaty -
judicially confirmed conclusions that Johnson had already derived from
his own understanding of British imperial constitutional law. Johnson
informed the Attorney General for New York in 1765 that (in his view)
the King's "Dominion" did not extend over aboriginal peoples "to whom
the [English] Laws have never Extended" and whose "native rights" had
not been purchased or taken by conquest.84 Johnson argued that "our
rights of Soil Extend no farther than they are actually purchased by
Consent of the Natives, "tho" in a political Sense our Claims are much
more Extensive... [since] our Kings... & their Adventurers took posses-
sion of several places in the Language of the times by Setting up Crosses
etc." These claims based upon discovery and possession were "kept up by
European powers to prevent the Encroachments or pretensions of each
other" and it was not "consistent with the Justice of our Constitution" to
extend them further, for the "right of Soil always remained to the
Ind[ian]s." 85 Johnson represented the crown at the key treaty councils of
the eighteenth century; indeed, according to Fenton, it was Johnson who
was responsible for re-discovering, mending and re-defining the cov-
enant chain after it had lapsed in the mid-eighteenth century.86 If the
effect of Marshall is to require a contextual reading of these treaties,
Johnson's many reports and letters must form a principal documentary
source from which that context is reconstructed.1
7
Johnson's position on the legal status of aboriginal nations under the
covenant chain was articulated in correspondence written in the after-
math of the British conquest of New France. In September of 1763,
Johnson informed the Lords of Trade that he had met "to renew the
82. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
83. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
84. Sir William Johnson to I.T. Kempe, Att. Gen. New York, 7 September 1765, in I.
Sullivan, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson (Albany: State University of New York, 1921-
1965) vol. 11 at 923-27 [hereinafter Johnson Papers].
85. Ibid.
86. Great Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 450, 468-69, 512.
87. The Supreme Court of Canada relied upon Johnson's correspondence when construing
a 1760 British-Huron treaty in Sioui, supra note 8 at 1053-59.
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Covenant Chain" with the Six Nations and Caughnawaga (Kahnawake)
Mohawks, and that he felt it necessary to remind their Lordships that
hostilities might result unless "erroneous accounts" of treaties like this
one were not corrected.88 The error, according to Johnson, was that the
Indians had "been represented" as having submitted to the crown as
"subjects" when "the very word would have startled them, had it been
ever pronounced by any Interpreter... ."" Johnson would have occasion
in subsequent months to reiterate this argument in more detail.
In October of 1763 the imperial crown-in-council enacted the Royal
Proclamation of 1763. 0 The Proclamation was omnibus legislation
designed to address simultaneously the organization of various colonial
constitutions in territories acquired from France as well as the land rights
of aboriginal peoples in both new and old colonial territories. The
Proclamation acknowledged aboriginal title to land in British North
America, prohibited settlement in the interior of the continent, and
confirmed rules governing the purchase by the crown of Indian lands
located in colonies where settlement was permitted. 91 Although these
provisions were welcomed by Johnson, the Proclamation also contained
assertions of crown sovereignty that appeared inconsistent with Johnson's
interpretation of the covenant chain: it stated that unceded Indian lands
were reserved to Indians under "our Sovereignty, Dominion and Protec-
tion." These words would later lead the Supreme Court of Canada to
conclude in Sparrow that there was never any doubt that the crown had
sovereignty over the territories to which the Proclamation applied.92
But was crown sovereignty as expressed by the Proclamation incon-
sistent with some on-going aboriginal sovereignty in Canada? In Johnson's
view it was not. Although he did not offer a theoretical reconciliation of
crown and native sovereignty, Johnson's actions and statements suggest
that he considered such reconciliation not only possible but legally
necessary. This reconciliation may have derived from Johnson's view of
the crown-aboriginal treaty relationship, for - as John Borrows has
demonstrated and the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently accepted - he
took elaborate steps to ensure that the Proclamation was incorporated
88. Sir William Johnson to Lords of Trade, 25 September 1763, in Doc. Rel. Col. Hist. N. Y.,
supra note 1, vol. 7 at 559.
89. Ibid.
90. Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11. No. 1.
91. One of the best judicial accounts of the Proclamation is that by A. Campbell J. in
Chippewas ofSarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney Geneneral), [ 1999] O.J. No. 1406 (QL) (Sup.
Ct.) at paras. 241-335; rev'd in part (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.) [hereinafter Chippewas
of Sarnia].
92. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, per Dickson C.J and LaForest J. for the Court at
1103.
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into the existing covenant chain between the crown and aboriginal
nations of the Great Lakes region.93 In July and August of 1764, a huge
number of aboriginal nations, including the Six Nations, the "Indians of
Canada" (including the Kahnawake and Akwesasne Mohawks), and the
"western Indians" (including the Ojibways from "the back of Toronto on
the North and East sides of Lake Huron," the Mississaugas of the north
shore of Lake Ontario, the Huron and Ottawa of the Detroit region) met
in council with Johnson at Niagara, and there the "great Covenant Chain"
was renewed and brightened, the terms of the Proclamation having first
been formally explained to and accepted by native delegates. 94 The terms
agreed upon at this treaty conference formed - and maybe still form - the
legal foundation for crown-aboriginal relations in Canada. But what were
the terms of this treaty? Did they reflect the principles of the gus-wen-tah?
Or, did the incorporation of the Proclamation into the covenant chain
mean that Indian nations recognized crown sovereignty and, in so doing,
gave up their own?
Writing to the imperial ministry just a few months after the covenant
chain and the Proclamation were confirmed at Niagara, Johnson stated:
"the Six Nations, Western Indians, ettc, having never been conquered,
either by the English or French, nor subject to the [English or French]
Laws, consider themselves as a free people .... -9" Aboriginal attitudes
had not been affected by the legal phraseology adopted in the Proclama-
tion, and neither had Johnson's. Thus, Johnson was shocked when, a few
months later, he saw the written text of a treaty made in his absence at
Detroit in September 1764, between Colonel J. Bradstreet on behalf of the
crown and a numberof these "Western Nations," including the Mississauga
of the Toronto area.96 The written text contained an uncompromising
93. Borrows, supra note 16 at 161 (the Proclamation "became a treaty at Niagara"). Borrows'
conclusions were recently accepted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia,
supra note 91 at paras. 54-56.
94. Treaty of Niagara, 17 July to 4 August 1764, in Johnson Papers, supra note 84, vol. 6 at
202, 278-307. See "Wampum at Niagara", supra note 16 and Great Law and the Longhouse,
supra note 13 at 529.
95. Sir William Johnson to Lords ofTrade, 8 October 1764, enclosing "Sentiments, Remarks,
and additions humbly offered to the Lords Cormissrs for Trade and Plantations, on their plan
for the future management of Indian Affairs," in Doc. Re. Col. Hist. N. Y., supra note 1, vol. 7,
661 at 665.
96. "Congress with the Western Nations," Detroit, 7-10 September 1764, in Johnson Papers,
supra note 84, vol. 4 at 526-28. Parmenter, supra note 16 at 632 observes that Bradstreet was
completely ignorant of, or wilfully subverted, customary Indian council protocol, and his
"reckless diplomacy" caused considerable "uproar."
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assertion of British sovereignty over native signatories. The first article
stated:
[Y]ou are the Subjects and Children of ... George the third of Great
Britain.. .and he has ... Sovereignty Over all and every part of this
Coun[try]... [in as] full and as ample a manner as in any part of
his.. .Dominions whatever ......
To Johnson it was inconceivable that this written text reflected accurately
the agreement reached orally at Detroit. So confident was he in this
conclusion that he proceeded to write letters of clarification and warning
to both the imperial government in London and civil and military
authorities in North America. Johnson's often-quoted letter to the Lords
of Trade, dated October 30, 1764, indicates both his understanding of the
covenant-chain treaty he had just negotiated at Niagara and the reasons
why the subsequent Bradstreet treaty text must have been inaccurate:
I have just received from Gen]. Gage a copy of a Treaty lately made at
Detroit by Coil: Bradstreet with the Hurons and some Ottowaes, &
Missisagaes; these people had subscribed to a Treaty with me at Niagara
in August last, but by the present Treaty I find, they make expressions of
subjection, which must either have arisen from the ignorance of the
Interpreter, or from some other Mistake; for I am well convinced, they
never mean or intend, any thing like it, and that they can not be brought
under our Laws, for some Centuries.. .I am impatient to hear the exact
particulars of the whole transaction, and I dread its consequences, as I
recollect that some attempts towards Sovereignty not long ago, was one of
the principle causes of all our troubles, and as I can see no motive for
proposing to them terms, which if they attended to them, they most
assuredly never meant to observe .... 98
Johnson wrote to the Lords of Trade on the same subject on December 26,
1764, and again he was adamant that the written version of the agreement
failed in a fundamental way to reflect the oral agreement reached in
council:
That all this [i.e., the actual treaty agreements reached with native nations]
has been misrepresented, and put on another footing[,] can be fully proved
by those who understood the words which really passed between the Coll.
& the Indians. - That a Treaty was huddled up with some of the Nations
at Detroit, on which occasion not a syllable was mentioned concerning
Subjection or Dominion.99
97. "Congress with the Western Nations", ibid.
98. Sir William Johnson to the Lords of Trade, 30 October 1764, in Doc. Re. Col. Hist. N.Y.,
supra note 1, vol. 7, 670 at 674. Also quoted in The Middle Ground, supra note 23 at 294;
Borrows, supra note 16 at 164 and L.I. Rotman, "Taking Aim at the Canons of Treaty
Interpretation in Canadian. Aboriginal Rights Jurisprudence" (1997) 46 U.N.B.L.J. II at 13
[hereinafter "Taking Aim"].
99. Sir William Johnson to Lords of Trade, 26 December 1764, in Doc. Re. Col. Hist. N.Y.,
supra note 1, vol. 7 at 685.
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Both Johnson, who had read the Proclamation to aboriginal nations at
Niagara, and the Lords of Trade, who had helped draft it, knew that it
purported to be a clear legislative expression of imperial will regarding
the territories to which it applied.'0° It is unlikely that by his comments
Johnson meant to challenge that legislative will. One can only assume
that, in his mind, there was no inconsistency between accepting the
general legislative assertion of crown sovereignty over territory and
refusing to accept specific "attempts" 0' at asserting sovereignty over
aboriginal nations within that territory.
On October 31, 1764, Johnson wrote to the Commander in Chief of
British forces in North America, General Thomas Gage. Though he
described the terms of Bradstreet's treaty as "extraordinary" he accepted
that it was common "to Insinuate" that Indians considered themselves to
be subjects. 02 Perplexed by both the specific terms of Bradstreet's treaty
and general assumptions made about treaties, Johnson conducted a
review of Indian Department papers hoping to find an explanation. His
letter to Gage continued:
I have been Just looking into the Indian Records, were I find in the Minutes
of 1751 that those who made ye Entry say, that Nine different Nations
acknowledged themselves to be his Majestys Subjects, altho I sat at that
Conference, made entrys of all the Transactions, in which there was not a
Word mentioned, which could imply a Subjection .... 03
To return to the images described at the outset of this essay, it would
appear that the scribe in the 'parlour' and the scribe at the edge of the
council fire were writing up the treaty in very different words. As Johnson
had suspected, oral agreements were not being faithfully incorporated
into official written treaty texts. But why not? Had British officials been
genuinely confused by linguistic, legal and cultural differences and
thereby prevented from transcribing oral treaty promises accurately? Or
had officials intentionally read into native diplomatic rhetoric legal
conclusions about sovereignty and subjection that grossly misrepre-
sented aboriginal meanings? Johnson conceded to Gage that during peace
negotiations following hostilities Indians were "apt to say many civil
things.. .to please those with whom they transact Affairs...." 0' Indeed,
100. The Board of Trade correspondence concerning the drafting of the Proclamation is
found at A. Shortt & A.G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relative to the Constitutional History of
Canada, 1759-1791 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1907) at 93-119.
101. Supranote98.
102. Sir William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 31 October 1764, in Johnson Papers, supra note
84, vol. 1 at 394-96.
103. Ibid. at 395.
104. Ibid. at 394.
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this was an aboriginal cultural trait that non-native observers of the time
may have had some difficulty appreciating: as mentioned above, aborigi-
nal nations adhered to customary rules of diplomatic protocol designed
to achieve reconciliation through an oral, rhetorical form that was
respectful, dignified, polite and metaphorical.0 5 However, these custom-
ary forms of diplomatic exchange were, understandably, potential sources
of interpretative confusion. According to Johnson, "no Nation of Indians
have any word which can express, or convey the Idea of Subjection," but
they often acknowledge the British King to be "our Father" and pledge to
"hold him fast by the hand" and do "w[ha]t he desires" and "many such
like words."' 6 In the course of transforming these oral expressions into
terminology deemed by officials to be suitable for a British legal
instrument, European assumptions about sovereignty, statehood, subjec-
tion and allegiance prevailed and the error was made. Said Johnson, "our
People too readily adopt & insert a Word very different in signification,
and never intended by the Indians...." 07
The eagerness with which officials assumed native subjection to
crown sovereignty may have been. the result of innocent misunderstand-
ing. Writing in 1727, Colden asserted that treaty minutes "are genuine
and truly related, as delivered by the sworn Interpreters, of whom Truth
only is required."' 8 However, he went on to make the following critical
concessions:
...I must own, that I suspect our Interpreters may not have done Justice to
the Indian Eloquence. For the Indians having but few Words, and few
complex Ideas, use many Metaphors in their Discourse, which interpreted
by an unskillful Tongue, may appear mean, and strike our Imagination
faintly. °9
Colden noted he was "disappointed" by the interpretation of treaty
proceedings, for lengthy speeches that "pleased and moved" listeners and
produced "full Force on the Imagination" were often translated "by one
single Sentence," the interpreter being content to express "the Sense" of
the speech "in as few Words as it could be expressed." 10
105. E.g., Guy Johnson, Depty. Supt. Ind. Dept., to Arthur Lee, 28 March 1772, in Johnson
Papers, supra note 84, vol. 12,950 at 952 ("at all Treaties ... Deliberations are Conducted with
Extraordinary regularity and Decorum. They never interrupt him that speaks, & very rarely use
any harsh Language whatever their thoughts are.). See generally, "Structure, Continuity
and Change", supra note 14 at 16.
106. Johnson to Gage, 31 October 1764, in Johnson Papers, supra note 84, vol. 11 at 395. On
the father-child metaphor, see supra note 23.
107. Ibid.
108. Colden, supra note 28, pt. I at xiii.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
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Misunderstandings also arose from deliberate misrepresentation. In
the French-British struggle for continental supremacy, Indian treaties
were diplomatic weapons: they represented paper armies by which
claims of territorial sovereignty could be extended far beyond areas over
which defacto European control was possible. If treaties evidenced that
the Six Nations were subjects, then (so it was argued) Six Nations'
conquests of interior territories were, in law, British conquests."' The
Lords of Trade could not have been more open about the surreptitious
nature of written treaty texts when, in the course of asking for authority
to make a treaty with a delegation of Cherokee chiefs similar to the Five
Nations covenant chain, they observed:
We conceive it is at present in our power to put the Cherikees upon the
same footing [as the Five Nations] ... To which may be added that in such
a Treaty, words may easily be inserted acknowledging their dependence
upon the Crown of Great Britain, which agreement remaining upon record
in our Office, would upon future disputes with any European Nation,
greatly strengthen our title in those parts, even to all the lands which these
people now possess. ... As this treaty is to be only with savages, we
presume Her Majesty's Orders signified to us by your Grace in a letter [as
opposed to letters patent] may be a sufficient power for us to act by upon
this occasion.12
If this was the broader political context within which treaties were made,
it is not surprising that translators were inclined to "insert" words of
subjection and sovereignty in place of aboriginal covenant-chain meta-
p.hors. As Johnson insisted, the claim that Indians became subjects of the
crown by treaty was a claim made "for our Interest ... when we were
squabbling with the French about Territory" and it was a "very gross
Mistake" to conclude that thoy had, in reality, submitted to the crown by
these treaties." 3 Like Johnson, Thomas Pownall contended in his 1765
111. Sir William Johnson to Thomas Gage, 7 October 1772, in Johnson Papers, supra note
84, vol. 12 at 994-95: "It is asserted as a general Principle that the Six Nations having conquered
such and such Nations, their Territorys belong to them, and the Six Nations being the Kings
Subjects which by treaty they have acknowledged themselves to be, those Lands belong to the
King."
112. Board of Trade to Duke of Newcastle (Secretary of State), 20 August 1730, in Public
Record Office, Calender of State Papers, Colonial Series, Americas and West Indies, Cecil
Headlam, ed., (London: H.M. Stationers Office, 1880-1969), 1730, No. 404 [emphasis added].
113. Johnson to Gage, 7 October 1772, in Johnson Papers, supra note 84, vol. 12 at 995
[emphasis added]. For a general discussion of how and why treaty records were edited and/or
revised in ways inconsistent with oral transactions, see Into the American Woods, supra note
5 at 254, 412-13, n. 6.
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book, The Administration of the Colonies that the "real spirit" of treaties
should be honoured and the "useless claim of dominion" over Indian
nations abandoned.' 
14
Johnson's critique of the Bradstreet treaty reflected his sincere belief
that written treaty texts misrepresented actual treaty agreements on the
point of subjection and sovereignty. His reports represent a clear and
concise account of the covenant chain that corroborates native oral
traditions surrounding the gus-wen-tah. In short, both aboriginal signa-
tories and the highest-ranking British official in the Indian Department
accepted that there was a treaty right to native sovereignty within the
territories of the Great Lakes region.
If the objective after Marshall is to seek a shared understanding of
treaties beneath their written texts, then the material examined from this
first historical period under consideration suggests that significant por-
tions of the written texts may be wholly unreliable because the native
understandings of the oral agreements reached ,were to the opposite
effect. But in such circumstances, how can a shated view be identified
which does not distort completely the intentions of one of the two parties
to the agreements? Johnson's voice on this matter may have been like the
moral conscience of the British empire, reminding it of inconvenient
truths that, if taken seriously at a higher policy level, would have
frustrated grand designs of continental domination. Is it to this dimension
of the multi-dimensional British understanding of the covenant chain that
one must look to discover the true legal meaning of the treaty? Leonard
Rotman argues that as the crown's representative Johnson spoke for and
bound the crown in treaty councils.111 This conclusion must be right. But
even if it is, it is unclear whether it was Johnson or the ministers of the
imperial crown in London who determined finally and authoritatively the
imperial position as to what Johnson's words meant. The dominant
theory in British imperial thought as to the covenant chain's meaning, at
least when the imperial ministry discussed crown sovereignty in relation
to other European states, was that it involved native submission as
subjects. Johnson's theory may have been a subordinate one, but in terms
of its ability to capture the genuine meaning of oral agreements, it was no
doubt closer to the mark. From this web of contradictory meanings and
purposes, which is the one that forms the British side of the elusive shared
understanding of the covenant chain that Marshall suggests we must
seek?
114. Pownall, supra note 17 at 179-80.
115. "Taking Aim", supra note 98 at 14-15.
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Judicial statements from this time suggest that courts may not have
been too concerned with these sorts of issues. On the one hand, crown-
aboriginal treaties were regarded by then as constitutive of legal rights
and duties. In Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut an appellate committee of
the Privy Council rejected the argument of the government of Connecti-
cut that the creation of an ad hoc tribunal by the imperial crown to
determine a treaty-based claim by the Mohegan nation to land within the
colony violated the colony's jurisdiction, stating: "it Appearing the
Mohegan Indians are a Nation with whom frequent Treatys have been
made, the Proper way of Determining the aforesaid Differences, is by Her
Matys Royall Commission .... 1"116 Clearly, the treaty had important legal
effects in British imperial constitutional law: it limited (or it permitted the
imperial crown to intervene to limit) the jurisdiction of Connecticut's
courts and legislatures.
On the other hand, however, the Mohegan case suggests that the
judicial focus would have been on written treaty texts. In a 1743 appellate
judgment, upheld by the Privy Council in 1772, the judges "Carefully
Considered and Inspected the Proofs & Exhibits relating to the Writing
Exhibited in Court" observing in relation to one deed:
...the Marks of Uncas [the chief Mohegan sachem], and Poxon as Indian
Witness thereto, appear by the Heavy bearing of the Hand on the Paper;
and the Irregularity and Stiffness in the Turnings to be made by Persons not
Accustomed to form regular Shapes or Figures, and are done in such
Manner as is not easy for any Person to Imitate.' 7
Having determined that this "Writing is the Genuine Act and Deed of Said
Uncas" '8 the court proceeded to read it, and a long line of subsequent
deeds and treaties, literally. The extreme care which was taken in
examining these physical pieces of paper and the native signatories'
"Marks" upon them contrasts sharply with the court's failure to address
expressly the gist of the Mohegan claim that the real intent behind these
deeds was that the colony held the disputed lands in trust for the Mohegan
nation. The court likewise failed to acknowledge as problematic the fact
that the native parties relied upon interpreters and could not read or write.
The court departed from this text-centred approach only once. The
government of Connecticut acknowledged Mohegan rights to the disputed
lands by accepting a surrender of certain of them in a 1681 treaty.
116. Quoted in "Mohegan Indians v Connecticut", supra note 53 at 814.
117. Governour & Company of Connecticut & Mohgean Indians, Judgment of 15 August
1743, PRO CO 5/1272:209 at 209-210 (aff'd: Report of the Appellate Committee of the Privy
Council, 19 December 1772, PRO PC 2/116: 513-15 and Order in Council, 15 January 1773,
PRO PC 2/117: 10).
118. Ibid.
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However the court decided that the colony might lawfully decide to
appear to acknowledge Mohegan claims without "any Impeachment" of
the colony's "former Right" to the lands because the "Indians [were] a
Barbarous People, not then Subject to the Regular Course of any Law,
easily misled by misapprehensions, and as easily Provoked to violent
mischievous Actions...."' In other words, the textual recognition of
rights was not legally meaningful in this one instance because the
colonists, unbeknownst to the native party, never really meant to accept
fully the legal implications of the text that they signed but rather were
merely seeking to hold off a "barbarous" and potentially violent foe by
giving the impression of acknowledging the validity of their land claim.
In effect, the judges found that the government was not bound because
when the agreement was reached it held its fingers crossed behind its
back.
This consideration of eighteenth-century judicial approaches to crown-
aboriginal treaty meanings illustrates another way in which "legal" and
"historical" interpretations of old treaties may differ. After considering
the above material, an historian today might conclude that in (British) law
of the time aboriginal-crown treaties would not have incorporated the
shared understanding of agreements but would have focused upon
written texts (at least when they favoured the crown). This legal-
historical conclusion may be accurate, but it is meaningless under the
Marshalltest. Marshall defines modem treaty meanings today by reference
to actual treaty meanings at the time, not British judicial interpretations
about treaties that were, or might have been, generated at that time.
2. 1783-1794: The British Withdrawal From the American Mid- West
Even if it is accepted that the covenant chain secured a treaty right to
aboriginal sovereignty for the aboriginal nations of the Great Lakes
region, it might be argued that subsequent constitutional developments
abrogated, or at least severely modified, that right. Many of the Indian
nations included in the 1764 Niagara covenant chain possessed territories
that, by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, were expressly left outside the
boundaries of any local colonial government or legal system. Once those
territories were included within the limits of a British colony, and once
English law and judicial jurisdiction were extended over these territories,
could it still be said that a treaty right to aboriginal sovereignty existed?
The first imperial legislative reform of the constitution of the Indian
territory created by the Proclamation came with the Quebec Act, 1774.12
119. Ibid. at 212.
120. 14 Geo. III, c. 83 (Imp.).
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By that Act, the boundaries of the colony of Quebec were extended over
the territory as far south as the Ohio River, including all of what is now
southern Ontario and the mid-western American states. Thereafter Brit-
ish courts began sitting in Detroit and some effort was made to bring
British justice (English criminal law and French-Canadian civil law) to
this frontier. 12 1 The pace of non-native settlement north of the Great
Lakes quickened after 1783, when Britain lost its territories south of the
Great Lakes to the newly-formed United States. By the Constitutional
Act, 1791, what was left of Quebec was divided into Upper and Lower
Canada and English civil law was introduced into the upper province
soon after. 22 The various imperial and colonial statutes by which these
constitutional changes were implemented are completely silent upon the
question of aboriginal legal status.
The notion that within the same colonial territories the British recognized
both aboriginal sovereignty secured by a covenant-chain treaty and
crown sovereignty manifested by statutes of the imperial Parliament
establishing local colonial governments, legislatures and court systems,
is, to say the least, problematic in light of assumed principles of British
constitutional law and theory. Still, as mentioned in Part I above, it might
be argued that British conceptions of sovereignty were not initially as
rigid as they would later become. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
attempt to build a larger constitutional argument that explains how
aboriginal and crown sovereignty might have coexisted within the
colonies of Quebec or Upper and Lower Canada (let alone their successor
constitutional units, the province of Canada and the dominion of Canada)
in a manner consistent with British constitutional principles. However,
the strength of any such argument will depend in part upon the proposition
that the covenant-chain treaty relationship was regarded by both British
officials and native leaders as surviving post-1774 constitutional
developments. To that end, attention is now tufned from Johnson's views
to those of John Graves Simcoe, the first lieutenant governor of Upper
Canada. In response to what may be called the "western post" crisis,"'
121. MD. Walters, "The Extension of Colonial Criminal Jurisdiction over the Aboriginal
Peoples of Upper Canada: Reconsidering the Shawanakiskie Case (1822-26), 46 U.T.L.J. 273
at 282-84 [hereinafter "Extension of Colonial Criminal Jurisdiction"].
122. ConstitutionalAct, 1791, 31 Geo. HI, c. 31 (Imp.) created Upper and Lower Canada; the
Act to introduce English law, 1792,32 Geo. III, c. I (Upp. Can.), s. 3 repealed French-Canadian
law and introduced English law on "property and civil rights" into Upper Canada; and An act
to establish a superior court of civiland criminal jurisdiction, 1794,34 Geo. III. c. 2 (Upp. Can)
erected a Court of King's Bench for Upper Canada having "all such powers and authorities as
by the law of England are incident to a superior court of civil and criminal jurisdiction."
123. See in general Calloway, supra note 77. Also Allen, supra note 2 at 55-86; The Middle
Ground, supra note 23 at 410,434, and Francis v. The Queen [ 1956] S.C.R. 618,3 D.L.R. (2d)
641, per Rand J. at 646.
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Simcoe adopted and applied Johnson's interpretation of the covenant
chain as determinative of aboriginal legal status in the Great Lakes region
after its inclusion by imperial statute within the limits of a colonial
government and legal system.
In 1783, Great Britain recognized the United States and ceded to it,
inter alia, that part of the province of Quebec south of the Great Lakes. '
24
The cession of this territory was made by the imperial ministry without
much regard for practical realities in the region; indeed, local officials
regarded it as a strategic blunder of monumental proportions. 2 The
governor of Quebec, Frederick Haldimand, after informing aboriginal
nations that their ally had just ceded their lands to their enemy, confessed:
"I own that I was much embarrassed."112 6 It was clear that, on the one hand,
Britain could not surrender de facto control over this territory to the
United States without provoking a war with Indian nations, but that, on
the other hand, it could not assist its aboriginal allies in defending their
territory from the Americans without renewal of war with the United
States. Thus, between 1783 and 1794 Britain pursued two policies: it
offered Indian nations normally resident in territories ceded to the United
States grants of land in what remained of its territories north of the Great
Lakes, and it refused to give up de facto control of posts in the ceded
region south of the Great Lakes until Jay's Treaty in 1794.' 27 This latter
124. Treaty of Paris, 1783, in Houston, supra note 40 at 267-70.
125. Brig.-Gen. A. Maclean to F. Haldimand, Gov. Que., 18 May 1783, in C.M. Johnston, ed,,
The Valley of the Six Nations: A Collection of Documents on the Indian Lands of the Grand
River (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1964), 35 ("The Indians from the Surmises they have
heard of the Boundaries, look upon our conduct to them as treacherous and Cruel; they told me
they never could believe that our King could pretend to Cede to America What was not his own
to give...."); Haldimand to T. Townsend, Sec. of State, 7 May 1783, PRO CO 42/44 at 120-
21 ("My own anxiety at present arises from an apprehension of the effects which the
Preliminaries will have upon the minds of our Indian Allies, who will consider themselves
abandoned to the resentment of an ungenerous and implacable Enemy"). The decision not to
protect native interests was made during a time of political instability in Britain, and may have
been based upon hopes of a future Anglo-American reunion: Calloway, supra note 77 at 7-8.
126. Haldimand to Lord North, 2 June 1783 PRO CO 42/44 at 126.
127. A. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1933) at 336-37. Also,
Lord Sydney to Brig. Genl. Henry Hope, 6 April 1786, in E.A. Cruikshank, ed., Records of
Niagara: A Collection of Documents Relating to the First Settlement (Niagara-on-the-Lake:
Niagara Historical Society, 1927-30) No. 39 at 87-88 ("if.. .the Indians should not accede to
any Proposals that may be made to them by the American Deputies, or cannot be prevailed upon
peacefully to accept the Asylum already directed to be offered to them, within the Province of
Quebec, Our situation will in some degree become embarrassing. To afford them open and
avowed Assistance, should Hostilities commence, must at all Events ... be avoided, but His
Majesty's Ministers at the same time do not think it either consistent with justice or good policy
entirely to abandon them.
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policy was designed to give indirect support to Indian nations in the area
in the hope that they could negotiate with the U.S. an independent Indian
"barrier" state between the British and American borders.'
28
With respect to the covenant chain and the question of sovereignty, the
result was the converse of the diplomatic position of Britain adopted from
the mid-seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth century: then Britain
portrayed Indian nations as subjects by treaty in order to support its
westward expansion in the face of French opposition, but now it portrayed
Indian nations as independent sovereigns by treaty in order to frustrate
American claims as it prepared to withdraw from the American interior.
Although Britain's portrayal of aboriginal legal status shifted from
subject-hood to sovereignty, the legal basis for its portrayals was the same
throughout: the covenant-chain treaties.
The British position is reflected in a series of dispatches and speeches
made by Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe. In a 1792 dispatch to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies, Henry Dundas, Simcoe described the Indian
nations of the Great Lakes region as "Free Nations" and "Independent
Nations," and he cited a 1763 dispatch from Johnson to show that
aboriginal nations had allowed British settlement in their territories but
"they never understood such Settlement as a Dominion."1 2' 9 According to
Simcoe, "the Indian sense of their own Independency" was readily
apparent from Johnson's reports of treaty councils with them.130 For their
part, the Americans conceded that their relationship with aboriginal
nations within the territory was somewhat uncertain. Thomas Jefferson
was said to have asserted that "the nature of the sovereignty of the United
States was not yet precisely defined," but it held a "sort of Paramount
Sovereignty" over the Indian nations and could therefore insist that all
British activities in their lands cease.13 1 Simcoe rejected Jefferson's
128. H. Dundas, Sec of State, to J. Simcoe & A. Clarke, Lts. Govrs., 5 May 1792, PRO CO
42/316 at 58-59 ("the great object to be attended to is to secure such a Barrier against the
American States by the intervention of the Indians ... as may render encroachments on either
side very difficult..."). See generally Burt, ibid. at 341.
129. Simcoe to Dundas, 28 April 1792, in E.A. Cruikshank, ed., The Correspondence of
Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe, with Allied Documents relating to his Administration of
the Government of Upper Canada (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923) vol. 1, 137 at
140 [hereinafter Simcoe Correspondence], [emphasis added].
130. Ibid. Simcoe's acceptance of Johnson's position is confirmed by his frequent references
to Johnson's reports to the Lords of Trade. See e.g., Simcoe to George Hammond, 21 January
1793, in Simcoe Correspondence, supra note 129, vol. 1 at 277-78: "I enclose for Your
Excellency's perusal an Extract from Sir William Johnson's Letter to the Board of Trade, on
which our System of Management of the Indians seems to me to have been expressly
founded...".
131. George Hammond to Lord Grenville, 8 June 1792, in Simcoe Correspondence, supra
note 129, vol. 5 at 14-17.
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position: Jefferson's assertion of American sovereignty was unfounded
because it was contrary to "the nature of the Indian Sovereignty...." 
132
This Indian right to sovereignty had been secured by treaties with the
crown prior to the cession of territory to the U.S., and once the U.S. was
made aware of these treaties it was compelled to acknowledge that the
rights it had received from Britain were limited by the Indian sovereignty
-or at least so Simcoe thought.33 To this end, Simcoe encouraged Indian
nations to request British mediation in their negotiations with the Ameri-
cans on forming the "Barrier" state, so that the British could "assist them
with the Copies of their former Treaties with the Indians, and Deeds of
Cession, to Shew what the Claims of the British were before the grant of
Independency [to the United States].... The Americans refused
British offers of mediation, and so Simcoe delivered certain treaty
documents to aboriginal nations directly. His view of their treaty relation-
ship with the crown was revealed clearly during a council held at Niagara
in 1793:
The Documents Records & Treaties between the British Governors - in
former times and your wise Forefathers, of which in consequence of your
request authentic copies are now transmitted to you, all establish the
Freedom & Independency of Your Nations.
These authentic Papers will prove that no King of Great Britain ever
claimed absolute power or Sovereignty over any of your Lands or
Territories that were not fairly sold or bestowed by Your ancestors at
Public Treaties. They will prove that your natural Independency has ever
been preserved... that the Right resulting from such Independency have
been reciprocally and constantly acknowledged.... 135
Simcoe' s line of reasoning is, of course, quite remarkable. Not only did
he insist that Indian sovereignty existed in Quebec up until 1783, but that
this sovereignty was secured to the Indian nations by their "former
Treaties" with the crown. In other words, Simcoe thought that the
132. Simcoe to Alured Clarke, 20 August 1792, in Simcoe Correspondence, supra note 129,
vol. 1 at 199-200 (emphasis added).
133. Simcoe to Alured Clarke, 1 April 1793, in Simcoe Correspondence, supra note 129, vol.
I at 308-309: "I hope speedily to receive from the Supt. General's office every deed and
document that shall be necessary to establish the Indian Rights, and I cannot but entertain a
strong belief that the Indians will universally persist in those rights; that they will declare them
to be unalienable without common consent, and that in consequence of their resolutions, Great
Britain will nearly obtain that intermediate boundary which His Majesty's Ministers have in
their contemplation".
134. Simcoe to Alexander McKee, Depty. Supt. Ind. Dept., 30 August 1792, in Simcoe
Correspondence, supra note 129, vol. 1 at 207-208.
135. Speech of Col. Simcoe to the Western Indians, Navy Hall, Niagara, 22 June 1793,
Simcoe Correspondence, supra note 129, vol. 1 at 363-65 (emphasis added).
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covenant chain constituted a treaty right to aboriginal sovereignty within
the boundaries of the British colony of Quebec. Simcoe's views were not
those of a renegade official: they were expressed in dispatches to imperial
ministers of the crown who, for their part, approved them.'36
Questions may be raised, however, about the value of Simcoe's views
as part of the documentary context of the covenant-chain treaty. It might
be argued that Simcoe was merely using aboriginal sovereignty as a
diplomatic tool in order to diffuse an international political crisis, and that
his assertions lacked genuine conviction about the inherent merits of the
case. In other words, he could trumpet the treaty basis for Indian
sovereignty loudly and forcefully because his purpose was simply to
restrict the scope of American sovereignty in favour of Indian nations in
territories that Britain had already ceded to the U.S. In response, it may
be said that even though non-native states rarely have a self-interest in
asserting native sovereignty within their own boundaries, it is not the case
that when they do arguments made in favour of native sovereignty are for
that reason alone discredited. Presumably the arguments have intrinsic
merit or not on their own account. It is hard to say that Simcoe's assertion
of a treaty right to Indian sovereignty was a self-interested representation
of a state that had already divested itself of the relevant territory. Once it
was accepted that Indian nations within that part of Quebec ceded to the
Americans had treaty rights to sovereignty then it must also have been
accepted that Indian nations in that part of Quebec not ceded to the
Americans had the very same treaty rights to sovereignty-after all, these
nations were parties to the same covenant-chain treaties.'3 7 Indeed, for
136. Simcoe summarized his view that aboriginal nations were "entirely independent" in
Quebec prior to the surrender of territory by the crown to the United States in 1783, and
therefore remained so afterwards: Simcoe to H. Dundas, Sec. State Colonies, 3 July 1794, in
Simcoe Correspondence, supra note 129, vol. 2 at 303-304. Secretary of State for the Colonies,
Lord Portland, responded that this letter "contains a very satisfactory Statement of the question
as it stands between us and the American States, in respect of the Indian Country and shews
on your part, a clear and distinct conception of the terms of the Treaty of 1783" which was
"perfectly silent" on rights to "the Indian Country South of the Treaty line": Portland to Simcoe,
4 October 1794, PRO CO 42/318: 162 at 165-66. In response to the claim by the Americans
that there was a "maxim that the affairs of the Indians within the boundary of any Nation
exclusively belong to that Nation" Simcoe said he could not "admit so general and so novel a
principle"; it was "never assumed by the British Nation" and it is incompatible with the "natural
rights" and "acknowledged Independency" of aboriginal peoples in the Americas- Simecm to
G. Hammond, 20 October 1794, PRO CO 42/318 at 372-75. Again, this letter was expressly
approved by the imperial ministry: Lord Portland to Simcoe, 8 January 1795, PRO CO 42/319
at 1-3.
137. See e.g., the imperial ministry encouraged "Indians who are within His Majesty's
Provinces" to join the negotiations between the United States and aboriginal nations south of
the Great Lakes: H. Dundas to Simcoe, 4 July 1794, PRO CO 42/318 at 100-2.
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Simcoe's argument to have credibility its substance had to be accepted by
Britain as a valid statement of law vis-A-vis Indian nations remaining
within its own provinces for it is unlikely that Britain could have
persuaded the U.S. to respect crown-aboriginal treaty rights that the
crown itself refused to acknowledge. In fact, in outlining his view of
relations with "those Nations within the boundary line" of Upper Canada,
Simcoe followed Johnson's model: the chiefs of the various nations
would assemble annually at a "Council Fire" to be lit at a purpose-built
"Council House" at the provincial capital. At such councils matters of
common concern would be regulated according to "ancient forms and
usages" that Johnson and aboriginal nations had, over the years, made
customary.' 38 Simcoe used the language of the brightened covenant
chain: "all the Nations should be bound in one covenant" and receive
"presents" accordingly. 39 An example of adherence to these principles
was a British-Mississauga council at Toronto in 1796 at which the "great
Belt" given by Johnson in the 1760s was brightened in order to avoid
hostilities after a drunken soldier killed several Mississaugans.1
40
In the first historical period examined, aboriginal and non-aboriginal
understandings of the covenant chain seemed diametrically opposed, yet
at a certain level the British empire (through Johnson) acknowledged the
problems with its position. British imperial thought therefore contained
dominant and subordinate theories about the covenant chain. In the
second historical period, the previously subordinate approach gained
ascendancy and took over the position as dominant paradigm. Aboriginal
and non-aboriginal understandings of the covenant chain seemed,
momentarily at least, to coalesce around a common position.
From the British judicial perspective, if crown-aboriginal treaties
recognized aboriginal nations as internationally sovereign, the treaties
138. Simcoe to Lord Dorchester, 9 March 1795, in Simcoe Correspondence, supra note 129,
vol. 3,318 at 322.
139. Ibid.
140. Minutes of a Council with the Missassagas, 26 September 1796, in E.A. Cruikshank, ed.,
The Correspondence of the Honourable Peter Russell with Allied Documents Relating to his
Administration of the Government of Upper Canada During the Official Term Lieutenant
Governor J.G. Simcoe while on Leave ofAbsence (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1932-
36) vol. 1 at 44-45 [hereinafter Russell Correspondence].
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would not have beenjusticiable in municipal courts.141 However, as long
as the covenant chain was "brightened" properly then this would not have
been a concern to aboriginal nations. Some legal support for the Simcoe
approach exists. In 1796 the Attorney General for Upper Canada, John
White, concluded that a freehold estate could not be granted to the Six
Nations for their lands in Upper Canada because "the Six Nations do not
acknowledge the Sovereignty of the King" and as they "call themselves
Allies" they "are, I presume, to be considered as Aliens" and therefore
(like all aliens) incapacitated by common law from holding freehold
estates from the crown.'42 Justice William Dummer Powell of the Upper
Canada King's Bench stated in a 1797 extra-judicial report on the Six
Nations in Upper Canada:
The manners of the Indians required that the Tract assigned them should
be in common[,] inalienable[,] and kept out of the view of our Municipal
Laws, at least so long as they affected to consider themselves Allies, for
this purpose a Council, a Treaty, a [wampum] Belt, was adequate; it was
a Compact of one nation with another, to be governed by general rules and
not by the provisions of the common Law of England ... [The] Government
cannot wish to constrain them or to introduce our Laws among them as
long as they continue a people apart .... "I
Although this statement seems to have gone unnoticed by modern
Canadian courts, it is one of the more powerful assertions by a Canadian
judge that aboriginal peoples within the boundaries of Canadian colonies
occupied an independent national status governed by treaty. Both Powell
and White approached the question of aboriginal legal status from the
aboriginal perspective: aboriginalpeoples considered the relationship as
one of treaty alliance between two independent nations, and this perspec-
tive was considered determinative of the non-native response. Because
these statements were not made in a judicial context it is hard to say
whether they reflect law or merely political realities.' Nevertheless, it
141. Treaties "between two sovereigns" in other imperial contexts (e.g. India) were held to
be beyond "municipal jurisdiction": Nabob ofCarnatic v. East India Co. [No. 2] (1793),2 Ves.
Jun. 56 at 60. Still, international treaties were regarded as creating norms binding upon the
crown: the crown's treaties with sovereign states created a "species of obligation" not
cognisable in municipal courts: Nabob of Carnatic v. East India Co. [No. 11 (1791), 1 Ves. Jun.
371 at 390; Lord Mansfield went so far as to say that treaties by which the crown acquired
sovereignty from other states were "sacred and inviolable, according to their true intent":
Campbell v. Hall (1774), Loft. 655 at 741.
142. John White, Att. Gen. Upp. Can., to Peter Russell, Adm. Can., 26 September 1796, in
Russell Correspondence, supra note 140, vol. 1 at 46.
143. William Dummer Powell to Peter Russell, 3 January 1797, in Russell Correspondence,
supra note 140, vol. 1 at 120-21.
144. I have discussed Powell's views in more depth at "Extension of Colonial Criminal
Jurisdiction", supra note 121.
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is fair to say that those judges and crown lawyers who had turned their
minds to the issue tended to share Simcoe' s general stance: they appeared
to accept that the shared understanding of the crown-aboriginal treaty
relationship was the relevant one, and that this understanding included
acknowledgment of aboriginal sovereignty. For a tenuous moment at the
end of the eighteenth-century - just as Upper Canada was about to be
"settled" in earnest - legal and political, and aboriginal and non-aborigi-
nal, conceptions of the covenant chain converged.
3. 1830-1860: The End of Imperial Control over Indian Affairs and
the Rusting of the Covenant Chain
Over the next thirty to forty years political, social and demographic
conditions changed dramatically and aboriginal nations in colonial
Canada saw their position of power crumble in the face of non-native
settlement and the consequent assault on traditional native hunting
economies.145 And yet, notwithstanding these contextual changes, the
forms within which crown-aboriginal relations were conducted were
resilient. The Indian Department in Upper and Lower Canada remained,
as it was in Sir William Johnson's day, an imperial department constitu-
tionally independent from local colonial governments and legislatures. 1
4 6
That department was headed by Sir William's son, Sir John Johnson, until
1828.47 (The deputy superintendent for Upper Canada was, until 1826,
William Claus, Sir William Johnson's grandson.)148 Indian Department
regulations directed Johnson the younger to conduct Indian affairs
according to the principles developed by Johnson the elder.149 These
regulations stated that the Department's function was to keep up "a
145. For a general discussion of immigration and settlement, see G.M. Craig, Upper Canada:
Its Formative Years, 1784-1841 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963) at 124-144.
146. St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577, per Strong
C.J. at 608 (Indian Department superintendents were appointed by the imperial crown to which
they were "responsible directly ... thus superceding the Provincial Governments"). See also,
Minute of the Executive Council of Canada (25 November 1845) NA RG1 Canada State
Books, 1841-67, vol. E at 84: the Indian Department was "not one under the superindendence
and management of the local authorities, but rather, one especially intrusted to YourExcellency
[the governor] by Her Majesty, as a matter, the direct control of which belongs to Imperial
Authority".
147. Sir John Johnson held office from 1782 to 1828: F. Armstrong, Handbook of Upper
Canadian Chronology and Territorial Legislation (London: University of Western Ontario,
Lawson Memorial Library, 1967) at 19.
148. Allen, supra note 2 at 90-91.
149. F. Halidmand, Commander in Chief, Instructions to Sir John Johnson, Supt. Gen. Indian
Dept., 6 February 1783, PRO CO 42/44:95, reissued by Lord Dorchester, Commander in Chief,
as "Instructions for the Good Government of the Indian Department" (27 March 1787, NA RG
10 vol. 789, 67759-67765); reissued again in 1812 (PRO CO 42/146).
150. Ibid.
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friendly intercourse and communication" with Indian nations in Canada
who "consider themselves free and independent, and are in fact unac-
quainted with Control and Subordination." 5 ° "Ceremonies and external
appearances" were to be given the "utmost attention" with "presents"
given "at Public Conferences or Councils" in order "to secure the
Attachment of their Chiefs and Heads of Tribes, by whose influence the
Conduct of their People is entirely governed."'15 1 The regulations adopt
the diplomatic forms employed by Johnson the elder, but they also hint
at a recurring theme in evolving British attitudes toward the substance of
the crown-aboriginal treaty relationship: securing the treaty relationship
was still contingent upon adherence to the customary brightening coun-
cils. However, the reference to external appearances may imply a lack of
internal commitment to the substantive implications of the treaty process.
A similar split between, on the one hand, the message about the treaty
relationship conveyed to aboriginal nations through external appearances
and, on the other hand, internal attitudes of crown ministers about the
treaty relationship, was identified in relation to the first historical period
examined above. In this last historical period, the split reappears and
widens.
Sir John Johnson seemed to share his father's views of the treaty
relationship. For example, when he was criticized in 1824 for not
ordering the Kahnawake Mohawk chiefs to meet with their Indian
Department agent, he stated:
On this subject I think it necessary to remind you, that the Indians have
been always considered by His Majesty's Government as Allies, and not
as Vassels; and under all the circumstances of the case, I could not feel
myself Justified in Commanding the Chiefs to attend upon W: Doucet,
when it is evidently his duty to attend upon them.
5 2
The minutes of a council held in December of 1817 between Claus and
the Six Nations confirm that covenant-chain customs still prevailed.'53
An Onondaga speaker, through an interpreter, commenced by recalling
"their Ancient Customs" and proceeded to perform the "Ceremony of
Condolence." He then gave an account of the formation of the "Silver
Chain" and how it had been preserved by the crown's Indian Department
representatives "who have always conformed to our manners and Cus-
toms."' 54 The speaker then made various submissions on matters of
151. Ibid.
152. Sir John Johnson, Supt. Genl. Indian Dept., to Col. Darling, Military Secty., 25 August
1824, NA RG 10 vol. 494, 30921-22 [emphasis in original].
153. Proceedings of a Council held at Fort George on the 3rd December 1817, NA RG 10 vol.
785, 181465-181474.
154. Ibid. 181465.
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common concern, such as land rights, war pensions, prohibition of liquor
sales and presents. He also alluded to their internal governance, noting
that unlike soldiers they could not be subjected to "regularity" as "it is
contrary to our Customs." He observed as well that in relation to their
"private Affairs" they had followed advice and remained internally
united.t 5 The next day, Claus replied. After salutations in the "customary
form" and delivery of "Four Strings of Wampum," he asserted that the
"Assurances" made during transactions with "our fore fathers" had and
will be maintained, as far as circumstances permit.1 56 He addressed each
of the submissions made the previous day, and closed by saying that he
rejoiced at hearing of their internal unity; giving five strings of black and
white wampum, he advised the "Warriors" to "attend to your Chiefs and
Sachems."'
57
By the late 1820s, however, the objectives of British Indian policy
were being re-defined, and when in 1828 the Indian Department passed
out of the control of the Johnson family for the first time since the 1750s
it was given a new mission: the "civilization" of aboriginal peoples)
Even so, at least some customary diplomatic forms survived and the
annual present-giving councils continued. For aboriginal peoples, present
giving ensured the supply of manufactured goods necessary for survival
as their traditional economies eroded, but it also performed the
constitutional function of brightening the covenant chain that was first
established in 1759-60 with Sir William Johnson. Presents attracted large
numbers of diverse nations to councils held in or near settled regions. 59
The ceremonies often included a "parade" and demonstrations of "their
national costume, habits, [and] dances" which attracted curious on-
155. Ibid. 181466, 181468.
156. Ibid. 181472.
157. Ibid. 181474.
158. In the last half of the 1820s, the imperial government decided to alter the primary
objective of Indian policy from maintaining Indians as military allies to "reclaiming them from
a state of barbarism" (Sir G. Murray, Sec. State Colonies, to Sir J. Kempt, Adm. Can., 25
January 1830, in U.K. Parliamentary Papers, Imperial Blue Books on Affairs Relating to
Canada; Reports, Returns and Other Papers, Presented to the Imperial Houses of Parliament
of Great Britain and Ireland Relating to Canada vol. 5 Papers Relative to the Aboriginal Tribes
in British Possessions, 1834, No. 617 at 87-88 [hereinafter Imperial Blue Books] and
encouraging them to "shake off the rude habits of savage life, and to embrace Christianity and
civilization" (Maj. Gen. H.C. Darling to Lord Dalhousie, Gov. Gen. Can. "Report upon the
exact state of the Indian Department," 24 July 1828, in Imperial Blue Books at 29).
159. Over 2,500 people attended a council on Manitoulin Island in 1838: J.B. Macaulay,
"Report on Indian Affairs," submitted to Sir George Arthur, Lieutenant Governor Upper
Canada, 22 April 1839, NA RG 10 vol. 117, 168711 at 168717 [hereinafter "Macaulay
Report"].
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lookers. 60 Occasionally there were scenes of cultural conflict: as the
chiefs of one band observed in 1849, some settlers found the, sight of
"many (almost) naked wild, and uncultivated Indians pitching their tents
in the vicinage" to be "disagreeable."
' 161
Over time, British officials appeared to lose sight of the constitutional
significance of present giving as the mechanism by which the covenant
chain was brightened. Local officials often defended the custom whenever
the imperial government questioned the need for the expense; but, in so
doing, they rarely mentioned the larger treaty context that gave the
custom its full meaning. Instead, presents were explained as compensa-
tion for losses sustained during the American Revolution,"62 as additional
payment for territories ceded for "very little consideration,"' 163 or as
"humane consideration" to assist their "civilization. ' ' 16 In 1858, the
imperial ministry ceased funding presents. It assured aboriginal peoples
that the local Canadian government - to which control over, and financial
responsibility for, Indian affairs was then being devolved -would respect
160. See sec. 3, pt. 2 [unpaginated] of Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada, Laid
Before the Legislative Assembly (Rawson W. Rawson, John Davidson, William Hepburn,
commissioned by Sir Charles Bagot, Gov. Gen.), 22 January 1844 (Sections 1 and 2 printed
at Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada (1844), Appendix EEE; Sec. 3 printed at
Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada (1847), Appendiz T) [hereinafter "Bagot
Report"].
161. Chiefs and Council of the Chippewas of Beausoleil Island to Captain T.G. Anderson,
Supt. Ind. Dept., 19 June 1849, NA RG 10, vol. 408 at 376-77.
162. G. Francis Gore, Lt. Gov. Upp. Can., to Viscount Castlereagh, Sec. State Colonies, 4
September 1809, PRO CO 42/349: 88 at 92: the Indians "during the American War were
faithful ... they bled most freely, and the Government pledged itself to relieve their necessities...";
T. Higginson, Supt. Gen. Indian Dept., to T.G. Anderson, Supt. Ind. Dept., 19 August 1845,
NA RG 10 vol. 409, 223-25: presents were based on a "claim on the country for [military]
services rendered."
163. Gore to Castlereagh, ibid.: "stipulations were also made when they surrendered after the
War, immense Tracts of Country to the Crown, for very little consideration, that such Presents
as they had heretofore then accustomed to receive, should not be withdrawn or lessened...."
164. Colonial Office Memorandum, "Question whether the Imperial Govt. is bound by any
agreements to continue giving Presents to the Indians in Canada," 10 January 1854, PRO CO
325/48: "the Presents were not granted to the Indians as a matter of right, and that they should
only be continued so long as was demanded by a humane consideration of the recipients"; Col.
Bruce, Supt. Gen. Indian Dept., to T.G. Anderson, Supt. Indian Dept., 8 July 1852, NA RG 10
vol. 411,454: presents "were originally issued to the Indians by the munificence of the Crown
as a means of promoting their comfort and civilization at a time when it was not in their power
to procure them by their own exertions or from their own resources."
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their claims.165 After taking responsibility for Indian affairs in 1860,166
the Canadian government did not revive the present-giving custom. The
annual process of brightening the covenant chain through present giving
that began in the early seventeenth century came to an abrupt end.
So long as presents were given at least, it can be said that the covenant
chain was brightened and aboriginal sovereignty was acknowledged in
nineteenth-century colonial Canada. However, if the British were ignorant,
or even indifferent, about the constitutional point behind presents, it may
be difficult to identify this as the "shared understanding" of the treaty
relationship as it then evolved. Still, like the first historical period
examined, some British officials acknowledged the aboriginal view. The
"Character of the Indian Race," wrote Lieutenant-Governor Sir Francis
Bond Head in 1836, was such that oral agreements made in "solemn
Form" with "the Delivery of a Wampum Belt of Shells" are "remembered
and handed down from Father to Son with an Accuracy and Retention of
Meaning which is quite extraordinary." 16' He went on to observe that
presents were, according to aboriginal peoples, part of the "Promises
which, accompanied by the Delivery of Wampums, were made to them
by our Generals during and at the Conclusion of the American Wars." 168
The aboriginal perspective was also acknowledged by a committee of the
Executive Council for Lower Canada in 1837. It conceded that an end to
presents - which it recommended -would meet with aboriginal opposition
in light of the aboriginal understanding of the origins of presents:
Although the Indians have no Express Agreement with the King's
Government to refer to, which entitles them to a Continuation [of presents]
... the whole tenor of the conduct observed to them since the Year 1759 has
led them to such an expectation, nor were there wanting Public Acts to
confirm it; for besides their having been at all times treated by the British
165. "Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the 8th of September, 1856, to
Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada" (Richard T. Pennefather, Supt. Geni. Indian Affairs,
Froome Talfourd and Thomas Worthington, commissioners), printed in Journals of the
Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, vol. 16 (1858), Appendix No. 21, Pt. I
[unpaginated] [hereinafter "Pennefather Report"].
166. The Act respecting the management of the Indian Lands, 1860, 23 Vict., c. 151 (Can.),
which was reserved by the governor for the assent of the imperial crown in London, "declares
the terms upon which Her Majesty assented to the transfer of the management of Indian affairs
from under the direct supervision of the Imperial Government": Ontario Mining Co. v. Seybold
(1901), 32 S.C.R. 1 per Gywnne J. at 7.
167. "Memorandum" enclosed in Sir F.B. Head, Lt. Gov. Upp. Can., to Lord Gleneig, Sec.
State Colonies, 20 November 1836 [hereinafter "Memorandum"], in U.K. Parliamentary
Papers, Copies or Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835, Between the Secretary of
State for the Colonies and the Governors of the British North American Provinces, Respecting
The Indians in Those Provinces (House of Commons, 17 June 1839) 124 at 128 [hereinafter
Correspondence Respecting the Indians].
168. Ibid.
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Government as Allies or Dependents in the Continental Wars, since that
period, by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Lands held or claimed by
them ... were in an especial manner taken under the Administration of the
Crown for their benefit ....
This Public Instrument [the RoyalProclamation of 1763] was formally
Communicated to the Indians of Canada, by the Officer who had a few
Years before been Appointed for their special Superintendence [Sir
William Johnson], and ... they have since regarded it as a Solemn Pledge
of the King's Protection of their interests .... 169
The report confirms three important aspects of the aboriginal approach to
presents: first, the covenant chain established with Sir William Johnson
at the Treaty of Niagara included as treaty pledges the provisions of the
Royal Proclamation of 1763; second, the Niagara treaty provided that
aboriginal peoples were "Allies" not subjects of the crown; and third, the
annual distribution of presents confirmed this treaty relationship. This
summary of aboriginal views is very similar to that given in 1858 by T.G.
Anderson, an Indian Department officer who described information he
had "gathered from Indian traditions relative to their past history,"
including their description of the council held by "a great English chief
(Sir Win. Johnson)" held after the British conquest of New France "at the
'Crooked Place"' (Niagara), the giving of "great presents to the Indians"
by Johnson, the "spreading before them [of] the great wampam belt of
friendship", and, finally, the promise that "the king of England wished to
adopt them as his own children, [and] that if they would become his true
and faithful allies, he would continue to give them presents as long as
water flowed, or trees grew .... ,,170 Lower level officials in direct contact
with aboriginal nations could not help but appreciate the aboriginal
169. Report of a Committee ofthe Executive Council of Lower Canada to the Earl of Gosford,
Governor of Lower Canada, 13 June 1837, NA RG 10, vol. 116,168618 at 168621-22.
170. "Evidence of Capt. Anderson, Visiting Superintendent of the Central District [Cobourgi,
Appendix No. 29 of the "Pennefather Report", supra note 165. Another example is the
evidence of Marcus Blair, Deputy Warden of Six Nations Lands, quoted in "Report of
Committee No. 4, On the Indian Department (R. Jameson, J.B. Macaulay, Wi. Hepburn),"
January 1840, submitted as part of Report on the Public Departments of the Province of Upper
Canada in 1839, PRO CO 42/472 at 42 (also printed at Journals of the Legislative Assembly
of Canada (1847), Appendix T, No. 1):
Independent of political reasons, it is to be remembered, that these Presents
originated in solemn Treaties, made by the Representatives of the British Crown, at
times when the assistance of the Indians was of momentous consequence. The
Wampums by which these Treaties were ratified, are still preserved amongst the
Tribes, and the memory of them is fondly cherished.
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perspective on presents, for once the decision was made to limit present
giving aboriginal peoples voiced their objections to these officials. 7'
It is significant, then, that certain British officials indicated a relatively
clear appreciation of aboriginal oral traditions concerning the covenant
chain; however it is also significant that none of these various reports
appeared to attribute much moral weight to the aboriginal perspective.
Bond Head observed that covenant chain ceremonies "sank deep in the
Minds of the Indians" but had "little Effect" on British officers present. 
72
Similarly, the Lower Canada Executive Council report conceded that the
customary practices and public acts of the crown's representatives had
given rise to treaty expectations on the part of aboriginal peoples, but then
concluded that they had no "express Agreement" giving them enforceable
treaty "entitle [ments]"'73 - presumably because their understanding of
the treaty relationship had not been committed to writing.
There was, in short, a widening gulf between aboriginal attitudes
toward their treaty relationship with the crown, as encouraged by the
"external appearances" of crown officials, and internal non-aboriginal
attitudes. This gulf is clearly manifested in several influential non-native
reports. In 1839 Justice James Macaulay of the Upper Canada King's
Bench acknowledged in an extra-judicial report that Indians associated
the present-giving custom with "National alliance and tribute" and
continuance of the custom therefore tended to uphold "the[ir] cherished
belief of independence as a separate people."'74 In his view, however, the
origin of presents was inexplicable, but rather than inquire into the basis
of the aboriginal interpretation by considering their oral traditions, he
concluded that resort to "the Public Departments in London" was
171. In 1845 the imperial government decided to refuse presents to Indians born after 1846.
The response of the chiefs of the Chippewas of Beausoleil Island was described in this way (Alvan
T. Carson to T.G. Anderson, Beausoleil Island, 20 April 1845, NA RG 10 vol. 408,556-59):
To this the Chiefs and people positively object declaring in their broken expressions
that such a course is contrary to every rule of Justice; and to their original covenant
with the British Government. Indeed the general opinion is that such an order never
came from the British Government, but rather from some section of the Indian
Department.
Also responding to the decision, Joseph Sawyer, a chief of the Credit River Mississauga,
expressed regret that "the Government do not consider themselves bound" to continue presents
because "[o]ur Ancestors have always told us ... that the British Government promised and
covenanted" to maintain presents "as long as the sun shall shine the waters flow, and grass grow
.("The Speech of Mr Joseph Sawyer Chief of the Credit Indians, in reply to the Speech of
Mr Supt. Thomas G. Anderson, on his first visit to the Indians under his Superintendence &c.
River Credit," 24 October 1845, NA RG 10 vol. 410, 72 at 74 [emphasis added]).
172. "Memorandum", supra note 167.
173. Supra note 169.
174. "Macaulay Report", supra note 159 at 168827.
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necessary to find the historical rationale for presents.'75 In Macaulay's
opinion the official written record would provide firm answers and the
"cherished belief[s]" - or oral traditions - of aboriginal peoples about
their treaty relationship with the crown were mere "complacent no-
tions."' 7 6 The most exhaustive survey of Indian affairs in nineteenth-
century Canada, the 1844 Bagot Commission report, concluded that it did
"not clearly appear how and when this practice [of present giving]
arose."'77 On the one hand, it found "no record of any agreement on the
part of the British Government" to give presents; on the other hand, it
accepted that the "practice" and "language" (i.e., oral statements) of the
"Officers of the Crown" toward aboriginal nations since 1759 "have led
the latter to expect it, and to consider the Government pledged.' 1 78 Once
again, there was a tendency to emphasize written records and to dismiss
aboriginal oral traditions and legitimate expectations arising from crown
practice and oral commitments.
The attitude adopted in the Macaulay and Bagot reports was also
embraced at the highest imperial levels. For example, the Secretary of
State for the Colonies during the 1830s, Lord Glenelg, accepted that
present giving may well have had something to do with securing help
from aboriginal nations during the American Revolution, but he con-
cluded that there was simply no point in "pursuing that inquiry" further
for the written record confirmed that the crown had made "no formal
obligations" to aboriginal nations concerning presents. 179 The Secretary
of State in the 1840s, Lord Grey, rejected an argument presented by the
Legislative Assembly for Canada in 1846 that a "pledge [to give presents]
was given and renewed from the remotest period of British Supremacy in
North America" and discontinuance of presents would "be regarded by
the Indians as a breach of a sacred compact."' 180 In his view, there was
simply no evidence that the crown had made any such treaty commitment
and it was an error to regard "the general conduct" of local officials in
their dealings with Indian nations as "implying a pledge."',' Instead, the
answer lay in the "records of this Office" which, he said, contained no
175. Ibid. at 168826.
176. Ibid. at 168827.
177. "Bagot Report", supra note 160 at sec. I [unpaginated].
178. Ibid., sec. 3 at pt. 2 Junpaginatedl.
179. Lord Gleneig to the Lt. Governors of Upper and Lower Canada, 14 June 1836, quoted
in the "Bagot Report", supra note 160, sec. 3 at pt. 2 [unpaginated].
180. Address of the Legislative Assembly of Canada to Her Majesty, 1846, quoted in
"Pennefather Report", supra note 165 at pt. 1 [unpaginated].
181. Lord Grey's dispatch responding the Legislative Assembly's address is quoted in
"Pennefather Report", supra note 165 at pt. I [unpaginated].
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evidence that such treaty commitments had "ever received the deliberate
sanction of Her Majesty's Government."' 82 A clearer statement of
divergent approaches to treaties is hard to imagine: Lord Grey's assertion
that a treaty was a piece of paper and could not arise (in absence of
writing) from participation in a treaty council would, of course, have
directly conflicted with the customary aboriginal approach to treaty
conferences.
To summarize, official statements from the 1830s and 1840s confirm
that there had been a loss of institutional knowledge about the meaning
of ancient constitutional and diplomatic forms. Although officials
appreciated that aboriginal peoples had an oral tradition concerning the
relationship between presents, treaties and aboriginal sovereignty, they
concluded that the tradition was irrelevant to the task of defining treaty
obligations. Instead, they looked to the written record, and finding no
express pledges of the sort identified by aboriginal peoples, concluded
that none existed. Had they been so inclined, officials of the nineteenth
century could have (like Simcoe did in the 1790s) read Sir William
Johnson's reports, or otherwise attempted to understand the aboriginal
traditions that gave normative content to the diplomatic forms still
followed. However, they were unwilling to engage in a process of cross-
cultural learning. Their objective was to destroy aboriginal political and
cultural distinctiveness, and presents frustrated that objective by (as it
was said) encouraging aboriginal peoples "to maintain their Indian
Habits, their Costume, and their hunting Excursions" thus making it
impossible to "assimilate them to the rest of the Population."' 83 Present-
giving councils should be abolished, concluded the Bagot report, because
the yearly "assemblage of this interesting race" led to the "objectionable
practice" of shows of "their national costume, habits, dances etc." with
the effect "of keeping them a distinct people ... of fostering their national
pride" and thus of retarding their "civilization." '184
Understanding the covenant chain required sensitivity to and respect
for aboriginal cultures and norms, as well as willingness to let go of the
written record as the exclusive determinant of normative commitments.
British officials at this time were capable of neither. Yet non-aboriginal
182. Ibid.
183. R. J. Routh to Earl of Gosford, Sec. State Colonies, 27 November 1835, in Correspondence
Respecting the Indians, supra note 167 at 37. The position of aboriginal rations, it was said
elsewhere, "ought to change with the Times" and presents merely served to "keep alive
Recollections in contradiction with every thing around them": Commissariat (Quebec),
Memorandum, 28 April 1836, enclosed in Earl of Gosford, Gov. Gen., to Lord Glenelg, Sec. State
Colonies, 13 July 1837, in Correspondence Respecting the Indians, supra note 167 at 38-39.
184. "Bagot Report", supra note 160, sec. 3 at pt. 2 [unpaginated].
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officials were not wholly ignorant of the aboriginal perspective. Reading
the documentary record as a whole it is fair to say that, at a subordinate
level of institutional consciousness, non-aboriginal officials appreciated
the fact that so long as the present-giving custom continued aboriginal
people inferred from this custom an intention to brighten the covenant
chain. But unlike Sir William Johnson's assertions of an earlier time,
official acknowledgements of aboriginal views in the mid-nineteenth
century did not represent an attempt to call the conscience of the British
empire into play; they were wholly dismissive of aboriginal understandings
of the covenant chain, regarding them as legally irrelevant.
More research is necessary to identify written sources from this period
that represent aboriginal views directly, rather than as summarized by
non-aboriginal officials. As seen in Part I above, the covenant chain was
regarded by aboriginal peoples as a dynamic relationship that evolved
with changing political contexts. It is clear that British views of the chain
changed as settlement increased and the "civilization" policy was
implemented, but did aboriginal views change too? In the opinion of at
least one aboriginal leader, the chain was an enduring commitment that
was altered but not destroyed by settlement and 'civilization'. Credit
River Mississauga chief Peter Jones (Kahkewaquonaby) wrote in his
1861 book History of the Ojebway Indians that the "silver chain" made
between aboriginal nations and the crown in the 1760s "placed them as
allies with the British nation, and not subjects," and "down to the present
day, [it] has not been violated."'' 85 However, he conceded that aboriginal
peoples were considered as allies and not subjects only "until the influx
of immigration completely outnumbered the aborigines," after which the
crown "assumed a parental authority" over them.18 6 If Jones was right -
the chain remained in force, unviolated, but aboriginal status had shifted
in response to demographic and other changes - what, precisely, was the
constitutional status that aboriginal people thought the chain secured for
their nations? If it resembled anything like the model of self-government
that Jones helped to establish on his own reserve then it would be fair to
say that even after the civilization project was underway, aboriginal
nations considered themselves as internally self-governing, or internally
sovereign, national units of crown subjects under the protection of the
crown. 187
185. P. Jones (Kahkewaquonaby), History of the Ojebway Indians; with Especial Reference
to their Conversion to Christianity (London: A.W. Bennett, 1861) at 216.
186. Ibid. at 217.
187. See "According to the Old Customs of Our Nation", supra note 47.
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During this time, the covenant chain was marginalized by judges as
well as other officials. In his 1839 report Justice Macaulay observed that
natives' "cherished belief of independence as a separate people" was
untenable because they were "domiciled within the organized portions of
the Province."' 88 In the 1852 case of Sheldon v. Ramsey Burns J. stated
that the Six Nations "while situated within the limits of this province"
could not be recognized as "a separate and independent nation, governed
by laws of their own.... "189 In other words, colonial judges regarded
crown sovereignty and aboriginal submission as an inevitable result of
aboriginal residency within provincial territories. This was a new basis
upon which to found crown sovereignty over aboriginal nations. Whereas
in the first period examined, the covenant chain was critical to British
claims to sovereignty, in this third period it was superfluous: crown
sovereignty over aboriginal peoples no longer depended upon twisting
the meaning of the covenant chain into a treaty about aboriginal subject-
hood as opposed to aboriginal sovereignty; subject-hood was now simply
a result of native residence in British territories.
Conclusions
The past reality of the covenant chain was manifested by and through the
behaviour of political actors of th e past. Present understandings of that
past reality, however, can only ever be manifested through language -
language, spoken or written, used or repeated, today in a process of
reasoned argument or interpretation. Interpretation is always a politically
charged enterprise, and so the discursive reality of the covenant chain
today will necessarily be a politically contested one. Still, sensible
discourse requires an interpretive community within which words have
some common meaning, and rules of engagement can be established
limiting the "political" contest between competing meanings of norma-
tive relationships like the covenant chain. "Law" provides one such
interpretive community. Its rules of discursive engagement ensure that
the political nature of interpretation is conducted in a particular manner.
The discipline of "history," or "ethnohistory," provides another interpre-
tive community. There is no use in pretending that a single meaning exists
for the covenant chain independently of the interpretative constructions
we might give it today. There is no covenant-chain "form" floating in the
ether. In this sense, it is fair to say that the covenant chain has multiple
meanings. However, it is also fair to say that within particular interpretive
188. "Macaulay Report", supra note 159 at 168827, 168835.
189. Doe d. Sheldon v. Ramsey (1852), 9 U.C.Q.B. 105 at 133-34.
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communities, and according to the rules of discursive engagement that
define the boundaries of those communities, there are better and worse
interpretations of the covenant chain. There is no reason to think that the
best interpretation for one interpretive community (like law) will neces-
sarily be the same as that for another (like history). Needless to say,
aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities may also constitute interpre-
tive communities with their own distinctive rules of discursive engage-
ment - and these communities may cut across those of law and history.
Still, the implicit message of Marshall is that competing cultural and
disciplinary views can somehow converge and connect to produce an
historical shared meaning that satisfies each of these interpretive commu-
nities: as a matter of law the meaning of crown-aboriginal treaties today
involves an historical question about treaty-meanings that were shared
in the past by two very different cultures. I do not attempt to address all
of the theoretical problems arising from such an ambitious project.
Instead, I focus on the problem identified in Part I above: even assuming
that Canadian law treats the identification of treaty meanings as an
historical issue, are there differences in legal and historical interpretative
methods that may lead to different approaches to this issue? Might the
legal search for a shared treaty-meaning conflict with the enthohistorian' s
objective of uncovering the past "as it really was"?
In Part I above, I suggested that one source of difficulty in this respect
might arise from different approaches to defining facts and norms. In
considering this issue, it may be helpful to begin with the description of
a legal problem arising from an abstract "legal"jurisdiction. X enters into
a valid oral agreement with Y that secures X. However, X secretly desires
to acquire 13 (the opposite of X), and knowing that Y will not agree to P,
X proceeds to write up an instrument that purports to record the X-Y
agreement in such a way as to suggest that Y actually agreed to 13 not X.
X obtains Y's signature to this instrument, but Y could not read or
understand it. Would X be able to insist after acting consistently for some
time with the original oral agreement concerning X, that the X-Y agree-
ment secures 03 and not X? X might argue that its outward acceptance of
X was irrelevant because inwardly it really wanted 13 - i.e. X is not bound
by the initial agreement because it kept its 'fingers crossed' behind its
back. X might also say that Y is bound by anything Y signs -even if Y had
no way of knowing the meaning of the written text and even if that text
was contrary to the actual agreement that it purported to represent.
Finally, X might say that its consistent behaviour acknowledging X is
irrelevant because, from its perspective, X is now obsolete and 1 has been
established in a defacto sense. X could, of course, say all of this and more,
but it is difficult to imagine a rational legal system that would support any
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other conclusion but that X is bound to Y to respect the original - and true
- agreement concerning X to the extent that that agreement has not been
lawfully abrogated or frustrated in the interim. X's 'fingers-crossed'
approach to the law of obligations would reduce agreements in general to
a grotesque joke.
I assume that this conclusion flows from the very notion of obligations
created by agreements within any political context informed by the rule
of law. It is important to emphasize, however, that this conclusion results
from a process of practical, or normative, reasoning: it identifies a norm
(binding agreements arise from what people agree together, not from
what one side inwardly desires), and applies this norm to the fact-scenario
described. This sort of interpretative engagement with norms and facts is
perhaps similar to what H.L.A. Hart described as an "internal" perspec-
tive about rules, for it seems to manifest that "reflective critical attitude"
toward human behaviour and the norms against which that behaviour can
be measured that Hart identified as essential to the viewpoint of someone
internally committed to a normative system. 190 Of course, the scenario
could be described in purely empirical terms: a social scientist observing
the events from an external perspective might well conclude that X and
Y each define the agreement differently and that no single meaning exists.
As linguistic representations of the facts, both the normative and the
empirical views are plausible. However, according to the rules of discur-
sive engagement that define the "legal" interpretive community - or the
"internal" perspective - the social scientist's interpretation is incomplete
and misleading. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what, if any, "social
science" would adopt rules of discursive engagement according to which
the simple "empirical" description would, without more, be the best
interpretation of the scenario. Presumably social scientists would want to
capture in some sense the normative character of relationships they
observe. A social scientist who merely records patterns of social behaviour
without considering issues of obligation or duty would be adopting what
Hart described as an "extreme external point of view," and accordingly
would "miss out a whole dimension of the social life of those whom he
is watching."191
Assuming for the sake of argument that the normative, or "internal,"
evaluation of the X-Y scenario is accepted as a sound approach to the
identification of the true agreement, the next question is whether this
process remains sound if the following details are added to the scenario:
X and Y are radically different in culture, language, and legal traditions;
190. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 55; also, 89-90.
191. Ibid. at 87.
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X is the British crown and Y represents aboriginal nations; the oral
agreement is the covenant chain; X is aboriginal sovereignty and P3 is
crown sovereignty; and, finally, the events in question took place be-
tween 140 and 340 years ago. Although there is perhaps no obvious
reason why the internal normative interpretative process adopted in
relation to the X-Y scenario could not apply with equal force to the more
detailed covenant-chain scenario, it must be conceded that, in light of the
additional facts, this approach seems less obvious than it did before and
the social scientific, or empirical, approach may now appear more
plausible. Indeed, this latter approach may be seen to inform the follow-
ing statement by Francis Jennings from his exhaustive examination of the
covenant chain in pre-revolutionary British North America:
... the Covenant Chain was legally ambiguous. Because of its bicultural
membership it was dual in aspect and must be defined twice. From the
Indian point of view, it was an organization of peers ... In the view of the
English statesmen, however, the Chain was an expedient to be maintained
until the empire could muster enough local power to actualize the crown's
pretensions to sovereignty. The English gave only defacto recognition to
Indian nations. Never, at any time, did they relinquish their own crown's
dejure pretensions to sovereignty.'92
More recent historical assessments of the covenant chain are similar.'93
Many of Jennings' conclusions were confirmed in Parts I and II above.
The covenant chain was "legally ambiguous". When considered in
relation to both pre- and post-revolutionary British North America it can
be defined more than "twice": not only did it have different meanings in
192. Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, supra note II at 373; also at 402: "British colonials had
to bide their time, they recognized Iroquois independence defacto by bowing to the necessity
for negotiation while preserving de jure claims to sovereignty."
193. E.g. Dennis argues that the Dutch-Five Nations covenant chain was an "ambiguous
relationship" in which each side "conceived of the alliance in terms of its own world view and
historical experience... Each bowed to the other without ever fully confronting the lack of
mutual understanding... [they] delude[d] themselves that they understood each other": supra
11 note at 178-79. Richter asserts: "Around the diplomacy of the Covenant-Chain developed
a rich body of intercultural rituals that.. .had different meanings for Indians and English":
Ordeal of the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 14 1. Fenton, in speaking of the kinship terms used
in covenant chain ceremonies, says: "The two cultures, Iroquois and European, employed
kinship terms for each other that had different meanings for each. To Europeans the term
'father' implied subordination to authority, whereas in Iroquois society 'father' took second
place to 'mother's brother'. The Five Nations never really acknowledged themselves 'subjects'
of either France or Britain. They preferred the term 'brothers' in political discourse": Great
Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 718. Merrell, in relation to 18th century treaties
generally, observes that although treaties served as practical solutions for day-to-day issues,
and there were "magical moments" when true agreement was reached, there was an "enduring
sense of difference that neither side could shake", and in the end "friendship and understanding"
eluded the parties because "attitudes, impulses and visions that divided colonist from Indian"
were overwhelming: Into the American Woods, supra note 5 at 39-40, 255-56.
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each of the three historical periods examined, but from the British
perspective alone the chain was defined in multiple ways in each period.
Finally, Jennings' description of the British attitude toward the covenant
chain - a "fingers-crossed" approach to agreements or (as he later wrote)
acceptance of the chain "with mental reservations"' 9 4 - accurately
describes official imperial views in the first and third periods examined.
The question with which I am concerned, however, is whether the legal
ambiguity of the covenant chain can now be resolved and a legal meaning
attributed to it. Why cannot the process of practical reasoning adopted in
relation to the X-Y scenario above be applied and the "fingers-crossed"
treaty meaning adopted by the crown be judged as either right or wrong?
There are a number of reasons why the social-science approach
underlying Jennings's conclusion seems persuasive even though that
approach lacked persuasive force in relation to the X-Y scenario de-
scribed above. First, it might be said that, unlike relations between X and
Y, crown-aboriginal relations in the colonial era existed in a purely
political or extra-legal dimension; there was no normative order within
which a legal meaning for an agreement could be defined. The analysis
in Parts I and II above suggests, however, that crown-aboriginal treaties
were regarded by both sides as constitutive of normative arrangements,
a conclusion confirmed by the customary practice of renewing past
commitments and redefining acceptable political conduct through the
annual "brightening" of the covenant chain in nation-to-nation coun-
cils. 195 To the extent that these councils established norms guiding the
behaviour of political actors, there was a normative system - a "bicul-
tural" rule of law - against which competing expressions of treaty
meaning can now be critically evaluated and judged as either right or
wrong. As an empirical statement, Jennings' description of the crown's
"finger' s-crossed" approach to the covenant chain is accurate; however,
as an assessment of the normative reality of the covenant chain his
conclusion is like the social scientist's assessment of the X-Y scenario in
that it fails to appreciate or account for the ways in which the relevant
agreement operated as a normative force upon the parties.
194. F. Jennings, The Founders of America: How Indians Discovered the Land, Pioneered
in It, and Created Great Classical Civilizations; How They Were Plunged into a Dark Age by
Invasion and Conquest; and How They are Reviving (New York: Norton, 1993) at 217.
195. This is not to say that parties always honoured the requirements of the chain - the Five
Nations were frequently frustrated by the failure of the British to provide military aid against
the French: Great Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 12; but still the chain provided a
standard against which such a failure could be identified and measured.
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Even assuming a bicultural rule of law existed, one might question
whether, in the case of the covenant chain, cultural differences frustrated
the establishment of a true agreement on the point of sovereignty. In the
X-Y scenario, it was assumed that X and Y really did reach a genuine oral
agreement that X then subsequently contrived to avoid. However, it
might be argued that the covenant chain was never really a true agreement
in this sense because even at the oral stage there was no "meeting of
minds" on the question of sovereignty: the two sides talked past each
other for hundreds of years, each genuinely misunderstanding the other.
If so, one would have to concede that there was no true agreement, just
two false impressions about an agreement that never existed. The prob-
lem with this defence of the Jennings' approach is that the British
documentary record simply does not support it. British officials knew
perfectly well how aboriginal peoples interpreted British conduct in
brightening the chain. As Simcoe observed in the 1790s, aboriginal
sovereignty was, through treaty councils, "reciprocally and constantly
acknowledged"'96 by the crown; or, as the Bagot report concluded in the
1840s, the "practice" and "language" of "Officers of the Crown" con-
stantly confirmed the aboriginal view, "fostering" their impression that
they were independent nations. 97 These statements acknowledge a
"shared understanding" or consensus ad idem of sorts - one that the
crown encouraged, albeit with fingers crossed.
Finally, it might be said that historians like Jennings are not in the
business of judging the positions taken by history's actors. It might be
said that historians are supposed to adopt the social-scientific stance
described above: their concern is to identify in an empirical manner what
people said and did without taking sides. As Trigger argues, they are not
to involve themselves in partisan or political movements. Indeed, in light
of the passage of time, the evolution of moral, political, and jurispruden-
tial attitudes, and the fundamentally different cultures involved, it might
be argued that it is impossible for an historian today to evaluate critically
but objectively the expressions of treaty-meaning adopted by past politi-
cal actors against some ambiguous set of norms that supposedly emerged
from custom and usage. A legal historian may wish, instead, to identify
how British judges of the time would have reacted to these questions - in
which case the 1743 Mohegan decision is clearly supportive of Jennings's
description of the British view as a "finger's crossed" approach to treaty
meaning.
196. Simcoe Correspondence, supra note 129, vol. 1 at 363-65.
197. Supra note 160, sec. 3 at pt. 2 [unpaginated].
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This argument must be considered in light of the conclusions drawn at
the end of Part I above, for it is based upon the supposed difference
between identifying historical facts and legal norms. In resolving this
theoretical problem, it is useful to develop with more precision the
"internal" (or normative) and "external" (or empirical) viewpoints. To
this end, we must return to Hart's treatment of interpretative perspective.
As discussed, Hart described the point of view of a participant for whom
rules have normative force as the "internal point of view," and he
contrasted that perspective with the "extreme external" perspective of the
observer of such a system who merely records facts without any account
of their normative aspect for participants. Neither of these two interpre-
tative perspectives seem to capture the appropriate point of view ofjudges
who must identify the shared meaning of old treaties in present Canadian
law. As seen in Part I, in contemporary Canadian law, judges are not
supposed to interpret treaties as cases or constitutions - or as present
"law." Instead, they are meant to find an historical meaning for parties
established in another time. This interpretative stance does not resemble
the "internal" perspective as defined by Hart. The historian too would not
adopt the internal perspective, for that perspective requires the sort of
"partisan" commitment to normative outcomes that (according to Trig-
ger) historians should avoid.
However, to adopt the social-science perspective and define treaty
meanings as mere historical facts would, in many cases, preclude the
articulation of a shared treaty meaning. The covenant chain is an excellent
example of a treaty which, defined in this manner, is nothing but a series
of conflicting facts. In reality, however, this so-called social-science
perspective is an artificial one, for historians and other social scientists
are capable of explaining - and, indeed, may be required to explain - the
normative aspect of human behaviour.
Historians of aboriginal-colonial relations acknowledge that they
render normative or moral judgments about historical events in a number
of different ways. They acknowledge, for example, that historians make
moral judgments implicitly, even subconsciously, they summarize and
interpret empirical data. In postmodernist terms, the interpreter is always,
to some degree, a participant in the linguistic construction of meaning
from historical texts. 198 Even assuming that this sort of moral evaluation
is inevitable, there remains a difference between an historian who seeks
198. J. Axtell, "Forked Tongues: Moral Judgments in Indian History" in J. Axtell, After
Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988) at 34-44 [hereinafter After Columbus]; R.R. Gadacz, "Understanding and
Interpretation in Historical Ethnology" (1981) 23 Anthropologica 181.
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merely to describe in a detached manner aboriginal-colonial relations and
an historian who seeks explicitly to judge the conduct of aboriginal or
colonial actors against some moral standard. Trigger, for example,
sought to describe Huron-French relations in an objective manner,
minimising moral judgment about either Huron or French conduct.199 He
later claimed that his approach was not designed to preclude moral
judgment about Huron-French relations but was a necessary foundation
for such critical evaluation.2°" Still, his approach is said to conflict with
that of other leading scholars who insist that the question is not whether
but how to evaluate, in moral terms, conflicting native and colonial values
and actions." 1 According to James Axtell, it is a fundamental part of the
historian's task in analysing aboriginal-colonial relations to judge the
conduct of history's actors against the moral standards of their own
communities as defined and understood in their own time - so long as
judgment is given subtly and sensitively after mastering the historical
record.
2 02
The express acknowledgment by historians of the desirability of this
sort of "moral" history has coincided with, or is perhaps part of, the rise
of the so-called "new Indian history," in which aboriginal peoples are
depicted not as victims located at the margins of significant historical
events but as moral agents composing diverse and complex communities
whose responses to colonial peoples and policies were critical to the
shaping of political and cultural realities in colonial North America.
203
Historians adopting this approach, says Richard White, emphasise the
native perspective, but in a detached fashion. They regard both native and
non-native cultural and national identities as contingent and problematic,
and colonialism is therefore depicted as a "tangled set of cultural contacts
and power relations" in which vastly dissimilar peoples influenced each
other in complex and often unintended ways. 21 These scholars treat the
shifting middle ground upon which aboriginal and colonial peoples
interacted as fraught with "complicated [cultural] reinventions, misun-
199. B. Trigger, "Brecht and Ethnohistory" (1975) 22 Ethnohistory 51.
200. B. Trigger, "Interest Groups, Alienation, and Humanity: A Reply to Ren6 Gadacz"
(1982) 24 Anthropologica 19 at 22-23.
201. W.E. Washburn, "A Moral History of Indian-White Relations: Needs and Opportunities
for Study" (1957) 4 Ethnohistory 47; J. Axtell, "A Moral History of Indian-White Relations
Revisited" [hereinafter "A Moral History"] in After Columbus, supra note 198 at 9-33.
202. "A Moral History", ibid. at 9, 23.
203. The Middle Ground, supra note 23; "Using the Past", supra note 58.
204. "Using the Past", ibid. at 231, 235. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 77 at 111, 122.
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derstandings, and appropriations for new purposes," and inter-cultural
exchanges "were as likely to be based on misunderstandings as under-
standing."2"5
These brief observations about the recent approaches to historical
method and native-colonial relations suggest that although historians are
willing to undertake a limited degree of explicit moral evaluation when
assessing native-colonial histories, this evaluative process is likely to be
conducted within a larger context of analysis that explores competing,
conflicting and shifting cultural identities. The focus is therefore as likely
to be on the misunderstandings as the understandings, and therefore
moral evaluation will tend to be in the form of criticism of respective
positions in light of each community's own moral standards rather than
in the form of practical reasoning that seeks to construct a specific shared
understanding, or norm, against which conflicting positions can be
judged. In other words, historians may be willing to assert that an
aboriginal custom or a colonial law was "morally wrong"2" but unwill-
ing to undertake the distinctive process of normative evaluation neces-
sary to construct a norm from inter-cultural practices as the basis for
judgments of right and wrong.
In many respects, Jennings' work as a whole exemplifies this pattern.
His 1975 book, The Invasion ofAmerica, which denounced the abandon-
ment by English colonists of their own moral standards, has been
described as "[v]irtually a casebook in moral history."20 7 Jennings, it
seems, is an historian unlikely to shy away from normative analysis.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that his conclusions about the covenant
chain were far more sophisticated and subtle than the above-quoted
statement on the double meaning of the covenant chain, taken in isolation,
suggests. Elsewhere he characterized the covenant chain as a mode of
political accommodation with sufficient "structure" to be called "a
constitution," an institution that effectively structured "intercultural
activity. '20 Jennings was apparently pulled toward a form of normative
205. "Using the Past", ibid. at 232.
206. Brownlie & Kelm, supra note 62 at 547 (discussing recent scholarship on potlatch laws).
207. "A Moral History", supra note 201 at 26, discussing F. Jennings, The Invasion of
America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1975).
208. Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, supra note 11 at 368,402. But see D.V. Jones, License for
Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in EarlyAmerica (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)
at 3, who argues on the one hand that the crown-Indian treaty relationship was a mechanism
for colonialism and native dispossession, and on the other hand that it was, for a while, an
"accommodation system, worked out by mutual agreement and compromise."
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reasoning that would have acknowledged the chain as having a single
meaning; indeed, at least one historian thought he had been pulled too far
in that direction. 09 Yet, Jennings seems to have resisted that pull to a
certain extent, for he refused to take the final, legalistic step of judging
winners in the contest of meanings. His analysis edges from a statement
of the covenant chain as a series of conflicting historical facts and toward
the view of the covenant chain as historical norm. By acknowledging the
normative aspect of the covenant chain, however, Jennings has not
adopted the "internal" interpretative perspective; rather, he has incorpo-
rated into the "external" viewpoint an account of how human behaviour
in a past setting may have been constitutive, for participants in that
setting, of a normative order. He has, in other words, adopted that
viewpoint that Hart argued was necessary for the social-scientific analy-
sis of legal systems - an "external" perspective in which "the observer
may, without accepting the rules himself... refer to the way in which they
[the participants in the system] are concerned with them [the rules] from
the internal point of view. "2° From this detached viewpoint, one could
presumably measure political positions against customary norms and
offer principled conclusions about their validity without descending into
the sort of partisan interpretation that Trigger regards as inappropriate for
historians.
The interesting point, however, is that while historians could adopt
such an approach they may choose not to do so. Many historians seem to
resist venturing as far as Jennings into the realm of normative reasoning
that is necessary to identify shared treaty meanings. Recent scholarship
tends to affirm: (a) that the covenant chain often secured practical
solutions to specific, or micro, problems; (b) that disagreement persisted
at the macro level about what constitutional status the parties occupied
under the chain; and (c) that English assertions of sovereignty were in
209. Richard Haan criticized Jennings's characterization of the chain as a constitution as a
Euro-centric conclusion that ignored the fragmented and competing visions of the chain held
by various aboriginal factions; the chain was, argued Haan, "even more ambiguous" than
Jennings thought: supra note 15 at 41-42, 57.
210. Hart, supra note 190 at 89.
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some sense morally suspecty 1' However, historians seem uninterested in
proceeding expressly to the next step of characterizing the chain as having
a singular and independent normative meaning on this point. One notable
exception is White.212 Although his "middle ground" concept was used
to describe political and diplomatic relations with nations of the Great
Lakes region generally, it extended to - and was exemplified by - the
covenant chain. The following description of the middle ground suggests
a very different approach to the British-Indian treaty relationships, one
that finds shared meaning in conflict:
On the middle ground diverse peoples adjust their differences through
what amounts to a process of creative, and often expedient, misunder-
standings. People try to persuade others who are different from themselves
by appealing to what they perceive to be the values and practices of those
others. They often misinterpret and distort both the values and the practices
of those they deal with, but from these misunderstandings arise new
meanings and through them new practices - the shared meanings and
practices of the middle ground.213
White does not use legalistic terms when describing middle ground, but
his analysis is consistent with the image of the covenant chain as a
singular normative order constituted through inter-cultural practice and
custom. Like the historians cited above, he notes the divergent aboriginal
211. Merrell's study of English-Indian eighteenth century treaties is a good example. He
asserts that treaties - or more accurately treaty negotiators or "go-betweens" - did create the
opportunity for a "cross-cultural conversation," and in the resolution of day-to-day problems
(e.g. specific criminal offences) it is possible to identify a "meeting of minds," but ultimately
treaties could not produce a common understanding on larger issues. Merrell himself does not
entertain the possibility that such a common understanding might now be constructed: Into the
American Woods, supra note 5 at 33,38-40,52,256. Similarly, Fenton describes the conflicting
views about sovereignty under the covenant chain, but does not attempt to define which view
was right and which wrong according to the chain's true meaning - although by using the
morally-loaded term "concocted" to describe the English view, his opinion on this matter is
perhaps clear: Great Law and the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 301,313, 321,356, 718. See also,
Dennis, supra note 11 at 178-79,268-71; Ordeal of the Longhouse, supra note 13 at 141; Allen,
supra note 2 at 16-18.
212. The Middle Ground, supra note 23. Another exception, perhaps, is Calloway, supra note
77 especially at 4-5.
213. The Middle Ground, ibid. at 10.
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and non-aboriginal views concerning subjecthood and sovereignty, but
unlike those historians he is willing to measure those views against the
true, shared meaning of the covenant chain.214
The reluctance by some historians to entertain questions from the
legalistic light of "shared meaning" may be justified. There is, however,
a real danger that the conclusion of Jennings - that the covenant chain
must be defined two (or more) times - may be taken out of context and
accepted as the historically accurate one. It is an accurate historical
conclusion - accurate, that is, for historians who choose to stop their
inquiry short of an evaluation of treaty meanings against the relevant
historical normative standard. However, it is an historical interpretation
of the covenant chain that would not meet the criteria for best interpreta-
tion set by the "legal" interpretive community, for in that community the
search for an historical normative-meaning is not only acceptable but
necessary. In the end, however, the difference between legal and histori-
cal interpretive communities may be less a matter of methodology and
more a matter of emphasis. The construction of colonial-aboriginal
"normative community" by Jeremy Webber215 or "just paradigms for
[colonial-indigenous] behavior" by Robert Williams, '16 both legal schol-
ars, may be absent from many historical analyses, but it is certainly
consistent with the substance of the scholarship of White and even
Jennings. So long as an external viewpoint that seeks to articulate the
internal viewpoint of others is maintained, these "legalistic" conclusions
cannot be rejected as ahistorical.
214. See, for example, White's characterization of British policy between 1^760-63, which
violated customary norms and led to Pontiac's War, and the subsequent return to customary
norms: "General Amherst's new vision ... was a simple one: the British were conquerors; the
Indians were subjects. It was a view that abolished the middle ground"; "Years of experience
in Indian affairs had taught [Sir William] Johnson and [George] Croghan what weight the
middle ground could bear; Amherst landed ponderously upon it and it cracked"; problems in
trade relations were "another sign of the deterioration of the old arrangements of the middle
ground"; "it seemed that the middle ground itself was about to crumble and cave in, leaving
a cultural and political chasm... Many of the fraternal kinship metaphors that had guided earlier
British-Algonquian relations yielded to Amherst's counterformulation of conquerors and
unruly subjects"; as Johnson "abandoned Bradstreet's claims of absolute sovereignty over the
Indians" the "political contours of the middle ground" re-emerged, and although the father-
children kinship metaphors were used, "the precise meaning" of the treaty metaphors "had once
more to be worked out in practice"; "Johnson carefully used the accustomed language of the
covenant chain and the usual diplomatic procedures of the middle ground to assure the Indians
of their continued independence"; the foundation of the middle ground arrangements was
"ancient custom", "a mutually comprehensible, jointly created world": ibid. at 256, 257, 264,
268, 306, 307,323.
215. Webber, supra note 27.
216. Wiliams, Jr., supra note 7 at II
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Whether accepted by historians in relation to crown-aboriginal treaties
or not, the external-internal viewpoint articulated by Hart is probably an
accurate description of the appropriate interpretative perspective for
judges seeking to articulate a shared treaty meaning under Marshall.
Returning to the specific issues of the covenant chain, it is important to
conclude by emphasizing that the process of constructing a shared
meaning in relation to sovereignty will not simply involve (as in the X-
Y scenario) selecting X and rejecting P. The construction of a shared
normative meaning for the treaty from what both sides said and did will
likely result in the conclusion that X (aboriginal sovereignty) and 03
(crown sovereignty) really were- to continue the covenant-chain metaphor
- linked together in a genuine sense, and that over time (especially after
settlement increased and the 'civilization' policy was introduced after
1830) the linkages between aboriginal and crown sovereignty were
implicitly increased and strengthened with each present-giving cer-
emony. The aboriginal sovereignty that was international in status in
1760 or 1790 may have become, through the dynamism of the chain itself,
domestic in status by 1860.
While the construction of shared meaning may not involve rejecting
either crown or aboriginal sovereignty, it will likely require the rejection
as legally significant those expressions of crown and aboriginal sover-
eignty on either side that are extreme and mutually exclusive, thereby
leaving as legally relevant only those treaty-meanings that occupied the
middle ground. In other words, the dominant expressions of treaty
meaning adopted by British officials in the first and third historical
periods examined above likely will not be accepted as accurate for
purposes of legal interpretation today; in contrast, the subordinate views
of these periods probably will be. This conclusion may be difficult for
judges trained in the common-law tradition to accept, for it means that the
official imperial crown position on the treaty will have little legal
significance today, and marginalized or unofficial interpretations from
the past will have comparatively greater legal significance today. This
conclusion is justified, however, because it can now be said that, as a
matter of legal and historical interpretation, the subordinate views not
only acknowledged the aboriginal perspective on the covenant chain's
meaning but they also reveal that British officials were either consciously
aware, or had sufficient information to allow us to conclude today that
they could have been and ought to have been consciously aware, that their
own conduct had given rise to a legitimate understanding among aborigi-
nal nations that the aboriginal perspective on the covenant chain was
shared by the crown. The subordinate views more accurately reflect a
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plausible interpretation of the "shared understanding" that we are now
seeking to articulate.
I suspect that the resulting shared meaning of the covenant chain as it
existed in Canada on the eve of confederation was that aboriginal nations
enjoyed an inherent right of self-government, or internal sovereignty,
under the protective umbrella of crown sovereignty .21 Such an approach
is consistent with comments made by Binnie J. in the recent Mitchell
case. 21 8 "The modem embodiment of the 'two-row' wampum concept,
modified to reflect some of the realities of a modem state, is," wrote
Binnie J., "the idea of a 'merged' or 'shared' sovereignty,"' with federal,
provincial and aboriginal components of Canadian federalism being
sovereign within their respective spheres. 219 In making these observa-
tions, Binnie J. appeared willing to re-configure the two-row wampum
metaphor as (in effect) a one-row wampum (representing the path of "a
single vessel (or ship of state)"), 220 and this may concern those aboriginal
peoples for whom the gus-wen-tah has ancient and sacred meaning. But
while there are limits to the extent to which unilateral judicial pronounce-
ments are capable of "brightening" or otherwise redefining the covenant
chain treaties for a modem world, Binnie J.'s observations in Mitchell are
a positive first step towards ajudicial re-consideration of crown-aborigi-
nal treaties and sovereignty, a step which is essential to re-building a legal
context within which the covenant chain can be brightened properly by
the treaty parties themselves.
217. Compare J.Y. Henderson, "Empowering Treaty Federalism" (1994), 5g Sask. L. Rev.
241 and "Treaty Responsibilities" supra note 61 at 326.
218. Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911.
219. Ibid. at paras. 129, 130 (Binnie J.'s observations came in a concurring judgment with
which Major J. agreed; his comments about aboriginal sovereignty are phrased in a tentative
manner).
220. Ibid. at para. 130.
